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ABSTRACT
The application of new media to cultural heritage is consistent with the policy
objectives that the copyright law of the United States stands to promote. However,
the practical application of the law currently hinders these objectives, often stifling
the creation and dissemination of new media works of cultural heritage. In this
context, copyright law presents a problem and not a solution, a barrier and not a
protection, dissuasion of creation and not encouragement and incentive. Defining the
legal scope and reach of digital property and new media within the realm of art and
cultural heritage law is critical for the benefit of creators, consumers, cultures, and
society as a whole. Unless a modification is made, or a solution adopted, the
problems presented by legal uncertainties and inadequacies will continue to operate
in a manner contrary to the main purpose of copyright, “To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.”
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CULTURAL HERITAGE & NEW MEDIA: A FUTURE FOR THE PAST
ANN MARIE SULLIVAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The twenty-first century has ushered in several fundamental shifts in the modes
of production, the nature of art and cultural heritage,1 and the way in which creative
works of authorship are experienced and preserved. “New media”2 art-works,
internet-based and multimedia pieces, and the application of technology in the
digitization of cultural heritage in museum, library, and archival practices 3 give rise
to multifaceted legal questions involving authorship, ownership, authenticity,

* © Ann Marie Sullivan 2016. Candidate for Juris Doctor, The John Marshall Law School,
January 2017; Bachelor of Fine Arts in Art History, Savannah College of Art & Design, 2011. I
would like to express my most sincere appreciation and gratitude to my spouse, friend, and editor,
Mariana Gutiérrez, who has been my partner in life and throughout this writing process, and to
whom this article is affectionately dedicated. I would also like to thank my parents, Mr. Robert
Dunn and Mr. Todd Mauldin, and Ms. Melissa Andress, for their unconditional support and
encouragement. Finally, I would like to thank the Board of The John Marshall Review of
Intellectual Property Law for all of their patience and guidance.
1 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defines
“cultural heritage” as “the legacy of physical artifacts and intangible attributes of a group or society
that are inherited from past generations, maintained in the present and bestowed for the benefit of
future generations.” This definition is further broken down into “intangible” and “tangible” cultural
heritage (tangible heritage includes the physical objects and artifacts belonging to a culture; for
example: buildings, historic places, monuments, and artifacts; intangible heritage is comprised of
nonphysical intellectual property, such as folklore, customs, beliefs, traditions, knowledge, and
language). Protecting Our Heritage and Fostering Creativity, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/. See
also John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 831
(1986) (Cultures throughout time have attempted to preserve and protect both the tangible and the
intangible heritage of their community in order to protect and preserve the culture to which they
belong); Andrew L. Adler & Stephen K. Urice, Resolving the Disjunction Between Cultural Property
Policy and Law: A Call for Reform, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 117 (2001).
2 Beverly Schreiber Jacoby, Here Comes the Future: “New Media” is transforming, reshaping
and disrupting established art world customs and categories, 237 N.Y.L.J. S2-3, 10 (Apr. 30, 2007)
(“The ‘New Media’ rubric refers mainly to technology-based delivery systems for the significant
artistic content critically acclaimed today. This involves concept, process and context delivered by
means of non-traditional products executed in various formats, often with moving parts and sound,
with hardware and software, often film/video based, electronic, digital, networked, Internet,
interactive, installation, computer-based and multi-media.”).
3 Ljiljana Manic, Marija Aleksic, & Mirjana Tankosic, Possibilities of New Technologies in
Promotion of the Cultural Heritage: Danube Virtual Museum, in ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENT,
ECOSYSTEMS & SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 322, 322-323 (Vladimir Marascu-Klein et al. eds., 2013)
(“Museums and cultural institutions are tasked with the common responsibility to safeguard culture
heritage for future generations. With innovative technologies and newly harnessed powers such as
3-D scanning and the digitization of culture, museums can overcome endless challenges and
limitations, such as geographic boundaries, collections mobility, insurances, preventing damage,
increased preservation, and the ability to actively answer the needs and wants of contemporary
visitors.”).
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copyright protection, unauthorized copying and distribution, 4 reproduction,
availability, and access. The evolution from analog to digital profoundly challenges
long-since-established conventions in the world of art 5 and cultural heritage, as well
as the role copyright plays in relation to these fields, requiring a parallel evolution in
current legal regimes and jurisprudence.6
The transformations in how cultural collections are preserved,7 communicated,
viewed, experienced, and consumed have expanded with the development of new
media.8 Museums and cultural institutions are no longer static depositories for
objects, as they have traditionally been.9 Custodians of culture are no longer bound
to and limited by the walls of their institutions, the physicality of objects, nor the
confines of time and place.10 Cultural heritage objects, some of which no longer exist
4 JOHN MERRYMAN, THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES, 1919-21 (2009) (distribution allows
the greater knowledge and appreciation of heritage by larger parts of the world population, as
opposed to only the community of origin); see also LUCAS LIXINSKI, INTANGIBLE CULTURAL
HERITAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (Oxford 2013) (in the long run, wide spread distribution and
access is “beneficial to the custodial community, which is bound to feel more pride over its own
heritage upon the realization of its appreciation by others.”).
5 Jacoby, supra note 2 (“‘New Media’ works and projects embody powerful creative forces
transforming, reshaping and disrupting established art world customs and categories for collectors,
galleries and museums alike.”).
6 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has stated that there is a need for
certain amendments to the existing intellectual property rights regimes and a search for new forms
of protection are required, notably out of the necessity for: the preservation and safeguarding of
intangible cultural heritage; the promotion of cultural diversity; and the promotion of creativity and
innovation, including a tradition-based one. WIPO, Consolidated Analysis of the Legal Protection of
Traditional Cultural Expressions, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/3, 2 (May 2003), annex, at ¶ 8. See also the
Declaration on the Future of WIPO, (Oct. 12, 2004), http://www.futureofwipo.org; Laurence R.
Helfer, Towards a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971,
1010-1012 (2007); James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 9
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 14 (2004).
7 MINGQUAN ZHOU ET AL., DIGITAL PRESERVATION TECHNOLOGY FOR CULTURAL HERITAGE
(2012) (discusses the technology and processes in digital preservation of cultural heritage, covering
topics in five major areas: Digitization of cultural heritage; Digital management in the cultural
heritage preservation; Restoration techniques for rigid solid relics; Restoration techniques for
paintings; and digital museums. It also includes examples of various applications of the digital
preservation of cultural heritage); see also Alonzo C. Addison, The Vanishing Virtual: Safeguarding
Heritage’s Endangers Digital Record, in NEW HERITAGE: NEW MEDIA AND CULTURAL HERITAGE 28
(Yehuda E. Kalay et al. eds., 2008) (discussing how information technology has grown with a
parallel growth in three-dimensional documentation and recordation of cultural heritage using
various tools such as electronic surveying instruments, laser scanners, photogrammatic cameras,
and CAD (computer-aided design) modelers, all of which has brought more and more “heritage data”
into the digital domain).
8 Gregory Wegner, Changing Roles of Academic and Research Libraries, Roundtable on
Technology and Change in Academic Libraries, convened by the ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE AND
RESEARCH LIBRARIES (ACRL) (Nov. 2006, Chicago), available at http://www.ala.org/
acrl/issues/value/changingroles; see also Addison, supra note 7, at 29 (“as the field has grown and
tools have become more accessible in both cost and ease of use, there has been a flood of interest.
Today ‘Virtual Heritage,’ ‘Digital Cultural Heritage,’ or ‘New Heritage’ is a common theme in
research grants, academic programs, and at numerous conferences and workshops”).
9 RESEARCH LIBRARY GROUP, Trusted Digital Repositories: Attributes and Responsibilities
(2002).
10 Bharat Dave, Virtual Heritage: Mediating Space, Time And Perspectives, in NEW HERITAGE:
NEW MEDIA AND CULTURAL HERITAGE 40 (Yehuda E. Kalay et al. eds., 2008) (virtual heritage
projects incorporate digital interactivity and media-rich representations to offer passages through
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in the physical form, can be recreated using digital technologies.11 Audiences, once
regarded solely as passive participants and silent onlookers, now interact,
participate, and view cultural collections in novel and experiential ways. 12
Unconventional usage of space and arrangement employed in the practice of utilizing
new media deliberately erases or blurs conventional boundaries, resulting in
increased interest and heightened understanding.13
With the application of new media and preservation through digitization, the
conservation and re-creation of cultural heritage has seen a new level of promise for
the future. It is the job of lawmakers14 and courts to keep pace with the rapidly
changing dimensions of the art world; yet there is much uncertainty when it comes to
various contemporary issues of art, digital media, and cultural heritage. Further, the
courts have traditionally been apprehensive and hesitant to create a concrete
precedent in approaching issues of art specifically in the legal context, often pointing
back to the role of the legislature.
Those charged with the fate of these priceless items of cultural heritage, the
museums of the world, are often confronted with legal issues when it comes to the
dissemination and digitization efforts for preservation that fundamentally stifle their
mission and objectives as an institution. The traditional viewpoint of museums is
that intellectual property laws, specifically copyright law, have not enabled their task
as a disseminator of knowledge and culture, but rather inhibited the museums’
ability to carry out their mission and mandate. 15
At the same time, scholars, researchers, and those advocating for the free flow of
information and access argue that museums and cultural institutions impose too
strict of a control over the cultural artifacts housed in their collections. From this
perspective, museums arguably hinder the advancement of knowledge and hinder
publications and discourse by making some projects—specifically in the art historical
world—economically impractical due to high image permissions costs and excessively
narrow guidelines for the use of an image. When cultural heritage is not readily
accessible, affected groups include, but are not limited to: archivists, librarians,
artists, scholars, historians, researchers, academics, universities, publishers,
time and space that are qualitatively different from what may be possible using traditional media
and narratives; significant shifts in virtual heritage studies have been made by identifying key
characteristics of successive generations of interactive digital media).
11 Cyber
Archaeologists Rebuild Destroyed Artifacts, NPR.ORG, (June 1, 2015),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2015/06/01/411138497/cyber-archaeologists-rebuilddestroyed-artifacts (“cyber archeologists” are working to put the pieces back together—digitally, at
least—by using a process called photogrammetry, or 3-D reconstruction from images).
12 For example, TATE BRITAIN, IK PRIZE 2015: TATE SENSORIUM (last visited Aug. 25, 2015),
http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-britain/display/ik-prize-2015-tate-sensorium (A new exhibition
at Tate Britain transforms visual art into a multi-sensory experience, surrounding paintings with
sounds, scents, tactile sensations and tastes inspired by the artwork. “The experience encourages a
new approach to interpreting artworks, using technology to stimulate the senses, triggering both
memory and imagination.”).
13 GLEN CREEBER & ROYSTON MARTIN, DIGITAL CULTURE: UNDERSTANDING NEW MEDIA:
UNDERSTANDING NEW MEDIA (2008).
14 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192 (2003) (“It is Congress that has been assigned the task
of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors in order to give the
public appropriate access to their work product.”).
15 RINA ELSTER PANTLONY, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR MUSEUMS 5 (World
Intellectual Property Organization, 2013).
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professors, social scientists, restoration and historic preservationists, library users,
students, museums, historical societies, arts and humanities fields, natural
scientists, cultural repositories, and, most importantly, the overall culture and the
general public.
The wide range of possibilities and affordances of digital technologies make
them the media of choice for the collection, management, representation, and
dissemination of cultural heritage.16 Digital media technologies are used to: create
cultural content through scanning, modeling, and archiving; manage digitized
content through powerful search engines and database organizational tools; and,
disseminate content and information through the world wide web to audiences on an
unprecedented global scale.17
The benefits which flow from the utilization,
incorporation, and application of new media to cultural heritage include: wider access
to information; enhanced preservation; heightened understanding; cross-cultural
collaboration; promotion and relevance to broader audiences; provocation of new
media forms in the additional expression, understanding, and collaboration with and
among cultural heritage stakeholders.18 Technology provides a platform for online
and interactive access on a global scale, subsequently creating new opportunities for
museums and cultural institutions to reach out and discover new and broader
audiences, fostering the advancement of access as promotion of cultural
achievements.19 Furthermore, “[t]echnological innovations have provided museums
with the means to contextualize their exhibitions in ways not previously imagined.” 20
Within this context, intellectual property has been identified as “an essential
building block now being used to create visitor experiences, where the virtual
environment is integrated in the physical exhibition as additional educational
material.”21
Although contemporary culture has altered its perception of the way in which
“art,” as a general whole, is thought of and experienced, intellectual property law has

16 Yehuda E. Kalay, Preserving Cultural Heritage through Digital Media, in NEW HERITAGE:
NEW MEDIA AND CULTURAL HERITAGE 1 (Yehuda E. Kalay et al. eds., 2008). Various applications of
“new media” to cultural heritage preservation include research, conservation and interpretation; 3D
offers a new set of tools and methodologies that will change the cultural heritage domain
significantly: new visualization technologies, both online and in the museum, and new interaction
technologies open a wide range of opportunities for museum curators and cultural heritage experts
to share the results of their work and the value and beauty of their collection). Digital Meets
Heritage, Beyond 3D Digitisation: Applications of 3D Technology in Cultural Heritage (Mar. 2015),
http://www.digitalmeetsculture.net/article/beyond-3d-digitisation-application-of-3d-technology-incultural-heritage/.
17 Yehuda E. Kalay, Virtual Heritage: Mediating Space, Time And Perspectives, in NEW
HERITAGE: NEW MEDIA AND CULTURAL HERITAGE 1 (Yehuda E. Kalay et al. eds., 2008).
18 Id. at 78.
19 European Institutions Use Technology To Foster Culture And Heritage, MICROSOFT NEWS
CENTRE EUROPE, (Mar. 6, 2014), http://news.microsoft.com/europe/2014/06/03/european-institutionsuse-technology-to-foster-culture-and-heritage/ (technology breaks down barriers of distance
encouraging cultural cooperation, boosting tourism, and stimulating local economies).
20Rina Elster Pantalony, The WIPO Guide on Managing Intellectual Property for Museums,
WORLD
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION
26
(Geneva,
2013),
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/museums_ip/ (examining why museums should develop and adopt
an intellectual property policy).
21 Id.
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failed to adapt alongside of these transformations.22 Lawmakers and courts appear
to be shirking their responsibility to keep pace with the rapidly changing dimensions
of intellectual property and the art world and the resulting uncertainty is thrown
into sharp relief when regarding digital media and cultural heritage.23 While the
benefits are boundless, the digitization of collections and the incorporation of new
media applications and technology to cultural heritage present great challenges for
museums in the twenty-first century.24 In order to survive and thrive in the digital
environment, the laws and practices governing cultural heritage must evolve to
address the progress and developments made in new media and technology. 25
This comment endeavors to explore the application of new media technology to
cultural heritage within the broader context of the intellectual property laws of the
United States, specifically placing emphasis on copyright’s role in fostering and
promoting creativity while advancing the public policy goal of expanding knowledge,
science, and “the useful arts.” In a debate that is influenced by and pulled in many
directions, each with their own individual set of consequences, all equally important,
this topic is ripe for exploration and consideration, not only at a level of scholarly
discourse, but at a legislative level, requiring action and attention. “The sole interest
of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.” 26 In a discussion
of copyright’s main policy directives, this comment examines whether those goals are
currently being served by the protections and limitations either encouraging or
constraining the creative arts community and efforts to protect, promote,
disseminate, preserve, restore, re-create, and re-contextualize cultural heritage sites
and artifacts on a global scale.
This comment begins by examining the intersection of cultural heritage and new
media technologies, highlighting various threats facing cultural heritage today, as
22 Vivek Wadhwa, Lawmakers Can’t Keep Up with Technology, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 19, 2014),
http://www.technologyreview.com/view/526 401/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-pace-with-technology/.
23 Mary L. Mills, New Technology and the Limitations of Copyright Law: An Argument for
Finding Alternatives to Copyright Legislation in an Era of Rapid Technological Change, 65 CHI.
KENT. L. REV. 307 (1989).
24 Christopher Johnson & Daniel J. Walworth, Protecting U.S. Intellectual Property Rights And
The Challenges Of Digital Piracy, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION. According to U.S.
industry and government officials, the infringement of intellectual property rights has reached
critical levels in the United States as well as abroad:
The speed and ease with which the duplication of products protected by IPR can
occur has created an urgent need for industries and governments alike to address
the protection of IPR in order to keep markets open to trade in the affected goods.
Copyrighted products such as software, movies, music and video recordings, and
other media products have been particularly affected by inadequate IPR
protection. New tools, such as writable compact discs (CDs) and, of course, the
Internet have made duplication not only effortless and low-cost, but anonymous
as well.
Id. at 1. The report continues, addressing the relationship to copyright law, “at the same
time, an increasingly digital world has spawned vigorous debate about how to maintain the
appropriate incentives afforded to creators of copyright content, given the ease of digital
copying, while continuing to provide for certain non-infringing uses of works for socially
beneficial purposes.” Id.
25 Wadhwa, supra note 22 (regulatory gaps exist because laws have not kept up with advances
in technology; and the gaps are getting wider as technology advances ever more rapidly).
26 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
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well as discussing how these concerns may be addressed or combatted through the
use of new media technologies. Examples are set forth ranging from simple digital
photography to three-dimensional comprehensive laser scanning systems, and
possible legal ramifications stemming therefrom. After laying this groundwork, this
comment reviews the ways in which the current state of the law and of intellectual
property regimes present various challenges when applied to cultural heritage, as
well as the inadequate protections and incentives provided. Considering the policy
justifications driving copyright and intellectual property law, as well as the ethical
imperatives that bound custodians of culture, the inherent conflict created by the
collision of these two fields is necessary. Following these examples and the analysis
framing the legal issues, a discussion is presented of the various rights,
consequences, obligations, and interests of the affected stakeholders. Keeping with
the overarching and controlling theme of copyright policy, the potential benefits and
applications as well as the possible pitfalls of addressing digital cultural heritage
within a framework of intellectual property law is explored from the perspectives of:
individual content-creators and rights-holders; cultural heritage institutions and
custodians; the cultural objects and artifacts themselves; society and the general
public; and the interests which copyright law primarily seek to serve.
Finally, this comment explores several different approaches to the intellectual
property protection of cultural heritage and new media. These approaches serve as
the basis for proposals and modifications set forth to address the issues arising from
the intersection of intellectual property law and the protection of cultural heritage.
This comment concludes with the observation that the only absolute remains that
intellectual property law must adapt to survive in and serve the digital generation.
Copyright law cannot control or prevent change; however, it certainly must not sit
idly by as these transformations take place. Rather, what can be controlled is how
copyright as a whole adapts, reacts, and addresses these changes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Copyright Law & its Origins
1. Authority & History
Copyright protection stems from both Constitutional and statutory authority.
Under the United States Constitution, Congress is empowered "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 27
27 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“Copyright Clause”).
The “Progress of Science,” under the
Copyright Clause, refers broadly to the creation and spread of knowledge and learning. See Golan v.
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 181 (2012); See also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973)
(explaining that the Clause describes both the objective which Congress may seek as well as the
means to achieve it, “[t]he objective is to promote the progress of science and the arts. As employed,
the terms ‘to promote’ are synonymous with the words ‘to stimulate,’ ‘to encourage,’ or ‘to induce.'”).
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Furthermore, Title 17 of the U.S. Code provides: “Copyright protection subsists, in
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression.”28
When copyright laws were first enacted, nationally and internationally, the
focus was primarily on the interests of the users, according authors and publishers a
level of protection “just strong enough to encourage and reward them, but weak
enough not to prevent free flow of culture and information.” 29 Historically, copyright
law has been transformed by culture, industry, and technology. Successive acts,
legislative history, and the practice of the Copyright Office establish that “works of
art” and “reproductions of works of art” are terms intended by Congress to include
the authority to copyright works in new mediums. 30 However, just as the invention
of the camera gave rise to both a new form of artistic expression and a new
reproduction method bringing the concepts of authenticity, originality, and
authorship into question, so too does the advent and application of new media
technologies bring about similar questions, especially in relation to the ongoing
debate regarding the status of the original and the copy.31
The constitutional purpose of copyright law informs all aspects of the debate. 32
The role which is to be played by Congress has been addressed by the Supreme
Court: “[T]he Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual
property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the
Clause.”33 Furthermore, “it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how to
best pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.” 34 As such, it the responsibility of
Congress to adapt the copyright laws to respond adequately and address
contemporary changes in technology and culture.35
2. Policy
Copyright law is intended to grant valuable and enforceable rights to authors,
publishers, and content creators without burdensome requirements, as well as to
17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2012).
NICOLA LUCCHI, DIGITAL MEDIA & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MANAGEMENT OF RIGHTS AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 23 (1st ed. 2006).
30 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 202 (1954) (The Court held that the legislative history of the
copyright act and the practice of the copyright agency showed that works of art and reproductions of
works of art were intended by Congress to be copyrighted).
31 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903) (The Court, in
considering whether chromolithographs were entitled to the protection of copyright law held in favor
of protection, noting that the pictures were protected as original pictorial illustrations, and that a
copyright is not affected by the fact that pictures represent actual visible things: “Even if drawn
from life, that fact would not deprive them of protection. Others are free to copy the original. They
are not free to copy the copy.”).
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
33 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003).
34 Id. at 212.
35 Author’s Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, at 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) and Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984)).
28
29
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encourage the production of literary or artistic works of lasting benefit. 36 The
primary purpose, however, of copyright law is not to reward the individual author,
but rather to secure “the general benefits derived by the public from the works of the
authors.”37 As the Supreme Court has explained, “The economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant . . . copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.” 38
Copyright and intellectual property protections must carefully balance a variety
of different interests: the reward to the owner or author and the benefit to the overall
public. However, as noted, the rights of an individual, in the overall balance and
consideration, come secondary to that of the public welfare.39 Creativity and
innovation do not exist in a vacuum—as such, the public welfare’s overall interest
and benefit from gaining access to these cultural heritage works is best advanced and
served by a copyright law and intellectual property scheme that reflects the interests
of a digital generation, and takes into consideration the rights of the public first, and
the rights of the individual content creator second.40
B. Copyright Law Generally
1. Originality & Creativity
“Originality,” for copyright purposes, is constitutionally and statutorily
mandated for all works seeking the protections of a copyright.41 This requirement is
embodied in the U.S. Federal Copyright Act, which affords that copyright protection
subsists in “original works of authorship.”42 Originality is the “one pervading
element” which is essential for copyright protection, regardless of the form of the

36 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
See also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 181 (2012) (The
provision of incentives for the creation of new works is an essential means to advance the spread of
knowledge and learning under the Copyright Clause; it is not, however, the sole means Congress
may use to promote the Progress of Science).
37 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
See also Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (“The monopoly created by copyright thus
rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public.”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The Copyright Act exists ‘to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good.”).
38 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
39 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003).
40 See generally, 1-3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.07
(addressing the rights of the copyright owner in a pre-existing work as against the author of a
derivative or collective work that incorporates such pre-existing work where the consent of the
owner of the pre-existing work is obtained in connection with the creation of the derivative or
collective work, but such consent is limited either in time or as to particular media, and the
derivative work is used in a manner that exceeds such limits).
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
42 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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work.43 Originality is distinct from novelty; thus, in order for a work to be
sufficiently “original,” it must be the product of independent creation. 44
While originality is required, the level necessary to meet this burden is
extremely low. The test for originality has a “low threshold,” requiring that the
author or authors contribute “at least some minimal degree of creativity,” or “more
than a trivial variation of a previous work.” 45 This requirement was addressed in the
1991 landmark Supreme Court case Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service. Co.46 The Court, in holding that the compilation of a telephone directory was
copyrightable, addresses the mandate for originality, adding that some non-obvious
element must be present.47 Feist also illustrates the general notion in copyright law
that facts and data are not eligible for copyright protection; however, originality in
the method of selection, arrangement, and presentation of the data or facts in a
compilation can qualify the work as copyrightable.48
2. Fixation
An additional requirement for U.S. copyright protection is fixation. 49 The U.S.
Copyright Act establishes that a work must be “fixed in a tangible medium of

43 Id.; see also Magic Mktg., Inc. v. Mailing Servs. of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 769 (W.D.
Pa. 1986) (“originality is the one pervading element essential for copyright protection regardless of
form of work.”); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[B] (1985).
44 Magic Mktg., Inc. v. Mailing Servs. of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
45 Id.; Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); see also
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
validity of a copyright in the reproduction of posters advertising a traveling circus. The Court, in so
holding, stated: “Others are free to copy the original [subject matter depicted]. They are not free to
copy the copy . . . The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature,” and thus can be
inherently original.”).
46 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
47 Id. at 345.
48 Id. at 349. The Court held that an alphabetical listing of telephone subscriber information
was “obvious” and lacked “at least some minimal degree of creativity” sufficient to warrant copyright
protection. Id. In addressing the issue of the defendant’s efforts which required extensive labor and
investment, the Court held that “sweat of the brow” alone is not the “creative spark” that copyright
requires, the sine qua non of originality, which is part of the constitutionally mandated requirement
for copyright. Id. at 359-60. In contrast to the United States’ refusal to apply the “sweat of the
brow” doctrine, some European countries, such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the
Netherlands, have traditionally applied the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, finding that skill and labor
alone will generally confer originality. For example, in BBC v. Magill, the Court held that the
weekly programming schedules of the BBC could not be reproduced because the work, skill, and
judgment required to produce the schedules was sufficient to qualify them for copyright protection.
BBC v. Magill, I.L.R.M. 534 (1990). However, this was before adoption of the European database
directive, which standardized E.U. copyright and authors’ rights law on an intellectual creation
standard. See Mark Powell, The European Union's Database Directive: An International Antidote to
The Side Effects of Feist?, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1215 (1997); European Parliament and Council
Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 2.
49 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are
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expression” for a period of “more than a transitory duration” in order to be
copyrightable.50 In other words, a work is sufficiently “fixed” when its embodiment
“is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 51
The issue in this context regarding “fixation” surrounds the changing digital
climate. Questions are raised as to whether a digital work is “fixed” as it transitions
from one medium to another or from one platform to another. Additionally, is the
work considered “fixed” when it is created in a digital form, or is it “fixed” when it is
recreated, for example, by using 3D printing? Works that exist on contributory
platforms and in crowd-sourced multimedia can change on a daily basis: information
and data is added or subtracted, alterations take place to update the piece as
discoveries are made, and software platforms are different when the media is viewed
on the internet versus when it is downloaded. One of the reasons why new media is
so valuable is also one of the reasons that may also limit its copyrightability.
3. Authorship & Expression
Even if a work is original and is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, not
every aspect of every creative work is protected by copyright. The law regulates only
the copying of an “original expression.” Each of those words is significant. First,
copyright protects only that which is original. 52 As addressed earlier, originality
entails independent creation by the author, and “at least some minimal degree of
creativity.”53 However, it is “universally true” that even creative works contain
material that is not original, because “all creative works draw on the common
wellspring that is the public domain.” 54 This principle excludes from copyright
protection the “raw materials” of art, such as colors, letters, descriptive facts,
standard geometric forms, as well as previous creative works that have fallen into
the public domain.55
An argument can be made that the addition and incorporation of substantial
content in a digital facsimile may be “transformative” enough so as to elevate the
digital replica into a newly copyrightable work. However, this argument is easily
stifled when one considers that this additional content—generally information such
as location, size, culture of origin, and other foundational specifics—while it is
valuable, is not eligible for copyright protection insofar as the baseline material is
simply factual, and facts are not copyrightable.
In the context of a recreation or digital reproduction of cultural heritage works,
an issue arises as to whether “creativity” or “original expression” exists in an exact
replication of a pre-existing work by simply transforming the original into a different
being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made
simultaneously with its transmission.”).
50 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
51 Id.
52 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
53 Id.
54 Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir.
2003).
55 Id.

[15:604 2016]

Cultural Heritage & New Media:
A Future for the Past

615

medium. While fairly broad for an original work of authorship, federal copyright
protection does not extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 56 Copyright is limited to
those aspects of work, deemed an "expression," which display the stamp of author's
originality.57
The Court in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Company v. Sarony considered the
issue of whether a photograph of Oscar Wilde contained enough creativity and
intellectual invention to constitute copyrightable subject matter.58 In Burrow-Giles,
the Court found creative elements in the photographer’s “own original mental
conception . . . posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and
arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories . . . arranging the
subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and
shade, [and] suggesting and evoking the desired expression.” 59 While a photograph is
an exact replica of a physical embodiment, Burrow-Giles extended copyright
protection insofar as a photograph embodies the original elements of artistic creation.
4. Ownership
When a work of art is created and sufficiently fixed in a tangible medium of
expression, the copyright vests in the author and grants to the copyright owner a
bundle of exclusive rights.60 The copyright owner may be either the artist, or if the
work is a work made for hire, the employer, person, or entity that commissioned the
work.61 The different “owners” of these projects could be: the artist, author, or
creator; a humanities scholar, providing the information, curation, content, and
directing the creation; the museums in physical possession of the object or artifact;
the culture to which the original object or artifact belonged; stakeholders providing
funding contributions; the country of origin; the public; a private or public
commissioner; a university; or any combination of these and others.
The benefits incentivizing authors to produce new works of lasting benefit are
the means; the end, “to promote the Progress of Science62 and useful Arts.”63 It
naturally follows that copyright protection is not unlimited and does not protect
everything or every use. The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship”
that are “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”64 The copyright vests
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 544 (1985).
58 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884).
59 Id.
60 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting copyright holder the exclusive rights of reproduction,
preparation of derivative works, distribution, performance and display).
61 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the
author or authors of the work”). 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of
this title”).
62 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) (“The ‘Progress of Science,’ refers broadly to ‘the
creation and spread of knowledge and learning.’”).
63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
64 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
56
57
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immediately with the author65 upon the creation66 of the work. Copyright protection
does not extend to facts or ideas, only to the expression of these ideas. Furthermore,
there are exceptions allowing the use of a copyrighted work either once it has fallen
into the public domain or if the use falls under the “fair use” doctrine. Works within
the public domain belong to the public67 and the public has a federal right to utilize
works within the public domain.68 Uses that are considered “fair” may be permissible
under certain circumstances.69
Due to the idea/expression distinction under
copyright law, every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly
available for public exploitation at the moment of publication; the author's expression
alone gains copyright protection. 70 The fair use limitation on copyright exclusivity
allows the public to use not only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but
also the author's expression itself in certain circumstances.71
5. Rights Granted
The protections of copyright grant to the owner not merely one exclusive right,
but rather several different and independent rights. Section 106 of the Copyright Act
provides copyright owners72 with a number of exclusive73 rights; and the Act also
provides certain exceptions and limitations to these exclusive rights. 74 In the United
States, these rights include: (1) the right to reproduce the work in copies; 75 (2) the
right to create derivative 76 works; (3) the right to distribute copies of the copyrighted
65 Where an author creates a work “for hire,” it is the employer and not the hired author who is
deemed the rightful owner of the work. TufAmerica, Inc. v. Codigo Music LLC, 2016 WL 626557, at
*14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2016); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (A “work made for hire” is- (1) a work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered
or commissioned”).
66 A work is “created” when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time; where a work
is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time
constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work has been prepared in different versions,
each version constitutes a separate work. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
67 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964).
68 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003).
69 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
70 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
71 Id.
72 The “copyright owner” with respect to any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright,
refers to the owner of that particular right, not necessarily the creator. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
73 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
74 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2012).
75 “Copies” are “material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2012). The term “copies” also includes “the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the
work is first fixed.” Id.
76 A “derivative work” is a “work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Furthermore, a work “consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship,” is also a “derivative work.” Id.
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work to the public; (4) the right to perform 77 the work publicly; (5) the right to
display78 the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) the right to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission. 79 Each of these rights, and
the control over each of these rights, depend upon the determination of authorship
and ownership. These rights instill upon the copyright owner not only the right to
exercise but the right to authorize others as well.

C. Current State of Cultural Heritage
“Heritage is part of our expressive life that tells us where we came from by
preserving and presenting voices from the past, grounding us in the linkages of
family, community, ethnicity, and nationality, giving us our creative vocabulary.”80
Unfortunately, on a global scale, cultural heritage objects and sites face a multitude
of threats due to: age and natural deterioration, theft81 and looting, conflicts of war,
tourism, aggressive urbanization, speculative development, natural disasters and
environmental forces82 both within cultural heritage institutions, as well as in the
field or on-location,83 individual researchers, professional societies, museums,

77 To “perform” a work means to “recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by
means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show
its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
78 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“To ‘display’ a work means to show a copy of it, either directly or by
means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process or, in the case of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequentially.”).
79 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). The sixth exclusive right, the right to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission, pertains only to sound recordings. See 17 U.S.C.
§106(6) (2012).
80 BILL IVEY, ARTS, INC.: HOW GREED AND NEGLECT HAVE DESTROYED OUR CULTURAL RIGHTS
55-56 (2008).
81 Each year, between 12,000 and 14,000 cultural objects are reported stolen, accounting for an
annual value of more than € 5 billion ($ 5.5 million). See John M. Milo & Vincent Sagaert, Private
Property Rights in Cultural Objects: Balancing Preservation of Cultural Objects and Certainty of
Trade in Belgian and Dutch Law, in ART & LAW 468 (Bert Demarsin et al. eds., 2008). Other
estimates place the illicit trafficking of antiquities to be over $ 6 billion per year. UNESCO,
Information Kit, The Fight Against the Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Objects, The 1970 Convention:
Past, Present and Future (2011) CLT/2011/CONF.207/6.
82 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has adopted
international conventions on the protection of cultural heritage. UNESCO provides a “standard list
of threats/factors affecting the Outstanding Universal Value of World Heritage properties”
consisting of a series of 14 primary factors, each encompassing a number of secondary factors.
Among those factors: Buildings and development; transportation infrastructure; utilities or service
infrastructure; pollution, biological resource use/modification; physical resource extraction; local
conditions affecting physical fabric; social/cultural uses of heritage; other human activities,
including illegal activities and the deliberate destruction of heritage; climate change and severe
weather events; sudden ecological or geological events, such as natural disasters; invasive/alien
species or “hyper-abundant” species; and, management and institutional factors. UNESCO WORLD
HERITAGE CONVENTION, List of Factors Affecting the Properties, http://whc.unesco.org/en/factors/.
83 Leah A Lievrouw, What's changed about new media? 6 NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY 1, 9-15 (2004).

[15:604 2016] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

618

universities, and governments have embraced new media technologies to augment
traditional methods of cultural management.84
For hundreds of years, cultural institutions have safeguarded the world’s art,
culture, history, and heritage. The use of new technologies can strengthen this
mission, while preserving these artifacts and collections for a worldwide audience of
today and tomorrow. When access to the art and heritage of peoples’ past is
restricted, something of a person’s understanding of human nature is lost. Just as
the “great libraries of the past—from the fabled collection at Alexandria to the early
public libraries of nineteenth-century America—stood as arguments for increasing
access,”85 this principle ought to be advocated for and encouraged throughout all
cultural institutions. Digital technologies and web-based communication platforms
remove obstacles in achieving the goal of wide dissemination of knowledge and
cultural heritage. “The ability to display and link collections from around the world
breaks down physical barriers to access, and the potential of reaching audiences
across social and economic boundaries blurs the distinction between the privileged
few and the general public.”86
1. Cultural Heritage Institutions
While there are institutional distinctions between museums and other cultural
heritage institutions—such as archives, libraries, and other institutions that are
custodians of cultural heritage—many of the intellectual property issues facing each
of them are similar. Therefore, despite their distinct purposes, missions, and
mandates, this comment refers generally to “museums” and “cultural heritage
institutions” as all-encompassing and interchangeable terms, in the effort to address
all institutions comprising the cultural heritage community. 87

84 Kalay, supra note 17, at 15 (“Individual researchers, professional societies, museums,
universities, and governments have embraced computer modeling and visualization to create virtual
reconstructions and databases of living, threatened or lost cultural heritage sites.”).
85 JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR OPEN ACCESS TO RESEARCH AND
SCHOLARSHIP (MIT Press, 1st ed. 2009).
86 HOWARD BESSER & JENNIFER TRANT, INTRODUCTION TO IMAGING 7 (1995).
87 While there are institutional distinctions between museums and other cultural heritage
institutions—such as archives, libraries, and other institutions that are custodians of cultural
heritage—many of the intellectual property issues and legal concerns facing each of them are
similar. Therefore, despite their distinct purposes, missions, and mandates, this comment refers to
“museums” and “cultural heritage institutions” as all-encompassing and interchangeable terms, in
the effort to address all institutions comprising the cultural heritage community. See Christian
Dupont, Libraries, Archives and Museums in the Twenty-First Century: Intersecting Missions,
Converging Futures?, 8 RBM: A JOURNAL OF RARE BOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS AND CULTURAL HERITAGE
13-19 (Spring, 2007), http://rbm.highwire.org/content/8/1/13.full.pdf (“cultural heritage institutions,
libraries, archives, and museums share common goals to acquire, preserve, and make accessible
artifacts and evidences of the world’s social, intellectual, artistic, even spiritual achievements.”). See
also Pantalony, supra note 20, at 5.
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a. Digitization of Collections
While there is no singular and comprehensive solution to eliminate the risks
facing cultural heritage, steps can be taken in order to mitigate the damage,88 as the
use of new media can assist in preservation efforts.89 When a museum digitizes an
object or a collection and grants online and virtual access to users across the world,
the underlying mission of the institute is achieved (to promote and share knowledge
and culture), while simultaneously providing incentives for visitors, thus driving
attendance and revenues. Furthermore, “digital heritage” serves as a valuable tool to
promote and foster understanding and appreciation for the heritage of any culture.
However, the digitization of cultural collections and artifacts is not always as clear
cut as it may sound. Before any institution embarks upon a digitization project or
initiative, a careful consideration of intellectual property rights necessarily must
include the laws governing: copyright, design rights, moral rights, cultural heritage
rights, trademarks, and patents.90
b. Digitization and the Question of Access
In February of 2016, in a project meant to question museum policies and notions
of cultural ownership, two German artists, Nora Al-Badri and Jan Nikolai Nelles,
captured headlines across the globe, announcing that the two snuck a Kinect Sensor
into the Neues Museum in Berlin and captured an unauthorized guerrilla 3D scan of
the bust of Queen Nefertiti, the precious artwork from ancient Egypt. 91 The
motivation driving this project, entitled “The Other Nefertiti,” was an attempt to
liberate the sculpture, which was removed from Egypt in the early 20th century by a
German team of archaeologists, according to a report from Ars Technica. 92 Given
that the bust is an incredibly important cultural artifact, Al-Badri and Nelles felt
that the people of Egypt had a right, at the very least, to a high-quality reproduction

88 Joe Parkinson, Ayla Albayrak & Duncan Mavin, Culture Brigade: Syrian ‘Monuments Men’
Race to Protect Antiquities as Looting Bankrolls Terror, WSJ (Feb. 10, 2015), available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/syrian-monuments-men-race-to-protect-antiquities-as-looting-bankrollsterror-1423615241 (a group of academics acting to save and preserve ancient artifacts and imperiled
archaeological sites from profiteers, desperate civilians and fundamentalists who have plundered
Syria’s rich artistic heritage to fund their war effort).
89 Tom Coghlan & Oliver Moody, High-Tech Plan To Save Ancient Sites From Isis, THE TIMES:
MIDDLE
EAST
(Aug.
28,
2015),
available
at
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/
news/world/middleeast/article4540560.ece (“Palmyra is rapidly becoming the symbol of Isis’s
cultural iconoclasm,” Roger Michel, the director for the Institute for Digital Archaeology (IDA) in
Oxford, told The Times, “If ISIS is permitted to wipe the slate clean and rewrite the history of a
region that defined global aesthetic and political sensibilities, we will collectively suffer a costly and
irreversible defeat. But there is hope. By placing the record of our past in the digital realm, it will
lie forever beyond the reach of vandals and terrorists.”).
90 David Arnold, Digital Artefacts: Possibilities and Purpose, in THE VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION
OF THE PAST 59 (Mark Greengrass & Lorna Hughes eds., 2008).
91 Charly Wilder, Swiping a Priceless Antiquity . . . With a Scanner and a 3-D Printer, NY
TIMES,
(Mar.
1,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/arts/design/other-nefertiti-3dprinter.html.
92 Id.
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of the work.93 They exhibited a 3D print of the bust publicly in Cairo, and released
the associated data file to the Internet on an open-access platform.94 However, the
digital scan itself gave rise to another scandal—researchers and scholars, after
examining the 3D digital version, suggested that the 3D scan was actually taken
from the Museum’s database by “hackers.” 95 The common theory is that the scan
came from hackers who breached the museum’s private servers and heisted a copy of
its professional-grade scan. Whether or not it was the artists’ intention, this project
has raised an important contemporary issue and has done a great deal to publicize
the fact that museums and cultural custodians are often in possession of high quality
scans of the works in their collection. The question thus becomes whether those files
should be more accessible to other museums, researchers, scholars, and the public.
The artists, by taking it upon themselves to make the object widely available,
confront cultural theft and the ever-persisting colonialist notions of national
ownership.96 As the practice of guarding 3D digitized data and reproductions is
customary among many museums,97 the project also brings to the forefront the way
in which 3D scanning technologies, which are becoming more affordable and
accessible, present cultural institutions with new opportunities, as well as new
challenges.
Among others, Nelles and Al-Badari, in their efforts to digitally repatriate
important cultural artifacts, ultimately seek to have the original Nefertiti bust, one
of the centerpieces of the Neues Museum, returned to Egypt, while a 3D-printed
replica would take its place in Berlin.98 This is one way in which other cultural
patrimony disputes—of which the most well-known is probably that between the
British Museum and Greece over the Elgin marbles—could be similarly resolved.99

Id.
Id.
95 Id.
96 Wilder, supra note 91.
97 However, this is by no means the policy of all museums; some cultural institutions take a
relatively open approach to scanning technology, while other museums actually go so far as to
encourage scanning. For example: Both the Art Institute of Chicago and the Metropolitan Museum
of Art encourage visitors to scan objects in their collections; while the British Museum even hosted a
“scanathon” for which museumgoers were asked to use scanning devices and smartphones, in an
effort to create a crowd-sourced digital archive, and the Musée du Louvre held a similar series of
digital workshops. See id.
98 Id.
99 The institution in which the Elgin Marbles are held, the British Museum, even suggests
using new media to digitally repatriate or remedy—at least in part—the cultural heritage dispute:
The aim of representing all known sculptures of the Parthenon in one place can be
achieved without their physical reunion. The British Museum has furnished
Greek colleagues with a full set of casts of all the Parthenon sculptures in the
British Museum, while 3D scanning offers opportunities to reunify the sculptures
virtually.
The
Parthenon
Sculptures,
BRITISH
MUSEUM
9.10.2
(Mar.
2016),
http://www.britishmuseum.org/about_us/news_and_press/statements/parthenon_sculptures/facts_an
d_figures.aspx; see generally Derek Fincham, The Parthenon Sculptures and Cultural Justice, 23
IPLJ 943 (2013).
93
94
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2. Work That No Longer Exists
New media technologies can be used to re-create cultural artifacts and
architecture that no longer exist in the physical form. To illustrate, new media
technologies were recently utilized in a form of “recreation” following the devastating
destruction of the two Buddhas of Bamiyan. 100 This past June, fourteen years after
the Taliban bombed Afghanistan’s Bamiyan Buddha statues, a Chinese couple
created life-sized holograms of the ancient artifacts and projected them back into
their cliff-side home.101 What was once thought of as lost forever, has made a return
in the form of 3D light projections that now fill the empty cliff where the original
statues once stood.102
3. Cultural Heritage as the Victim of War
Various efforts utilizing a new media approach to the preservation and
recordation of cultural heritage have arisen in the wake of the deliberate destruction
and theft carried out by the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” (“ISIS”), in the Middle
East and North Africa—notably in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya. 103 Some argue
that the damage and destruction that has been inflicted on antiquities in these
countries pales beside the hundreds of thousands of lives lost and millions uprooted
in countries whose structures—human, political, and cultural—may never return to
what they once were.104 Those charged with protecting cultural heritage argue that
100 KENNETH W. MORGAN, THE PATH OF THE BUDDHA: BUDDHISM INTERPRETED BY BUDDHISTS,
at 43 (Ronald Press Co., 1956) (famous for their beauty, craftsmanship and size, and as a
representation of the classic blended style of Gandhara art and prior to their destruction in 2001,
these iconic statues were the largest examples of standing Buddha carvings in the world); W.L.
Rathje, Why the Taliban are destroying Buddhas, USATODAY.COM, (Mar. 22, 2001) (“In March 2001,
Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar ordered the Buddhas destroyed, bringing these
monumental statues to the ground, leaving only the rubble and memory behind.”); Hartwig Schmidt,
Reconstruction of Ancient Buildings, in THE CONSERVATION OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITES IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN REGION: AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY THE GETTY
CONSERVATION INSTITUTE AND THE J. PAUL GETTY MUSEUM, 41-50 (May 1995),
http://d2aohiyo3d3idm.cloudfront.net/publications/
virtuallibrary/0892364866.pdf;
Documents,
10th Expert Working Group Meeting for the Safeguarding of the Cultural Landscape and
Archaeological Remains of the Bamiyan Valley World Heritage Property, Afghanistan, UNESCO,
available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/208 (“While the Valley was determined by UNESCO to
have ‘Outstanding Universal Value’ and the Buddhas were designated a World Heritage site
following a review in 2002, UNESCO ultimately determined that rebuilding the statues will be
difficult, if not impossible.”).
101 Mary-Ann Russon, Afghanistan: Buddhas Of Bamiyan Resurrected As Laser Projections,
TECH. INT’L, BUSINESS TIMES UK (Jun. 12, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/buddha-statuesdestroyed-by-taliban-resurrected-laser-projections-1505794.
102 Id.
103 Threats to Cultural Heritage in Iraq and Syria, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, (Sept. 23, 2014),
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/09/232028.htm.
104 According to a Report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “From
January 2014 through 29 September 2015, a total of 3,206,736 persons became internally displaced
in Iraq, including over 1 million school age girls and boys.” Furthermore, the report provides,
“Civilians continue to suffer the most from the non-international armed conflict in Iraq. From
January 1, 2014 through October 31, 2015, UNAMI/OHCHR recorded at least 55,047 civilian
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attacks on people and their culture are inextricably linked.105 Irina Bokova, the
director general of UNESCO, in speaking about cultural cleansing as a war crime
and tactic, eloquently addressed the relationship between these two threats, “[t]his is
not a choice between protecting people or protecting culture. It is part of the same
responsibility because culture is about belonging, identity, values, common history
and the kind of world that we want to live in.” 106
As a result of the apparent inability of either governments or international
agencies to stop or prevent the fanatic levelers of ISIS, other cultural organizations
have sprung up in their wake and are attempting to create 3D records and digital
replicas of various cultural heritage sites, artifacts, and monuments in an effort to
preserve their existence, at least in digital form, for future generations. 107
These cultural organizations are working with Iraqi and Syrian experts,
drawing on local knowledge and providing equipment and training, in an effort to
create digital records of endangered ancient sites. 108 Among the pioneers is CyArk, a
nonprofit organization based in California, which is dedicated to the 3D digital
preservation of cultural heritage.109 CyArk has sent teams to scan high-risk—but
still accessible—sites in Syria and Iraq, and plans to extend the project further to 200
other locations in neighboring countries. 110 Additionally, the World Monuments
Fund, a New York-based nonprofit charity, commissioned a 3D laser-scan of the
Ishtar Gate in Iraq in conjunction with the Iraq State Board of Antiquities and
Heritage.111
Project Mosul and the Million Image Database Project further demonstrate the
application of photography and high-tech 3D imaging and printing in the
preservation of history. Project Mosul is trying to preserve artifacts and monuments
destroyed by ISIS in Iraq using 3D modeling, based on crowd-sourced photographs,
casualties as a result of the conflict, with 18,802 people killed and 36,245 wounded.” This Report on
the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq is published jointly by the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR), and it covers the period of May 1 to October 31, 2015. See Report on the
Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May-31 October 2015, at 9 (Jan. 2016),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMIReport1May31October2015.pdf.
105 Stephen Farrell, Using Lasers to Preserve Antiquities Threatened by ISIS, NY TIMES.COM,
(Dec. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/arts/design/using-laser-scanners-to-preserveantiquities-in-isiss-cross-hairs.html?action=click&contentCollection
=Art%20%26%20Design&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article.
106 Address by Irina Bokova, Director-General of UNESCO, International Conference on
Cultural Heritage at Risk, the Role of Museums in War and Conflict Museum of Mediterranean and
Near
Eastern
Antiquities
(Stockholm,
Nov.
26,
2015),
available
at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002357/235720e.pdf.
107 Farrell, supra note 105.
108 Id.
109 CyArk is “[a] prototype project to test the concept of a digital archive of 3D survey
information of endangered world heritage sites.” CYARK, http://www.cyark.org (last visited Mar. 4,
2016).
110 Farrell, supra note 105; CyArk’s mission is located prominently on its website and aligns
perfectly with this initiative: “CyArk was founded in 2003 to ensure heritage sites are available to
future generations, while making them uniquely accessible today. CyArk operates internationally
as a 501(c)3 non-profit organization with the mission of using new technologies to create a free, 3D
online library of the world's cultural heritage sites before they are lost to natural disasters,
destroyed by human aggression or ravaged by the passage of time.” http://www.cyark.org/about/.
111 Farrell, supra note 105.
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with the ultimate goal of reproducing destroyed or damaged artifacts.112 The
Institute for Digital Archaeology (IDA) created the Million Image Database Project in
an effort to compile the open-source platform using photographs taken before the
destruction of various sites—such as Palmyra—to record, and even rebuild
monuments.113 Through partnership with other organizations, the IDA aims to
create accessible digital archives that encourage interdisciplinary collaboration and
the crowd-sourcing of research.114
Francesco Bandarin, the Assistant
Director-General for Culture of UNESCO, has praised IDA’s efforts in saying, “[t]he
documentation of cultural heritage in areas affected by conflict or natural disasters,
including through the use of new digital technologies, is a critical step to preserve the
memory of our past and mitigate the risk of possible damage or loss of precious
cultural assets.”115 The IDA’s campaign also plans to "flood" war-torn regions with
thousands of 3D cameras so people can scan and (digitally) preserve their region's
historical architecture and artifacts.116
D. Copyright, Cultural Heritage, & New Media
The main issues concerning the intellectual property ownership rights of new
media and cultural heritage works are primarily governed and regulated under rules
based in copyright. The role played by copyright is clear:
Copyright protection is above all one of the means of promoting,
enriching and disseminating the national cultural heritage.
A
country’s development depends to a very great extent on the

112 PROJECT MOSUL, http://projectmosul.org/. Project Mosul is an initiative started by Matthew
Vincent (ITN-DCH Researcher), Chance Coughenour (ITN-DCH Researcher), and Marinos
Ioannides (ITN-DCH Coordinator) of the Initial Training Network for Digital Cultural Heritage.
The project is a response to the destruction of cultural heritage by the Islamic States, and proposes
to use crowd-sourced imagery to digitally reconstruct the heritage that has been destroyed.
However, while these submitted pictures have been done so voluntarily as a form of
“crowd-sourcing” what will become of the eventual copyright of the final work is unknown, what
copyright will attach, if any, to whom would the ownership of the copyright belong.
113 The Institute for Digital Archaeology (IDA) is a joint venture between Harvard University,
the University of Oxford, and Dubai’s Museum of the Future that promotes the development and use
of digital imaging and 3D printing techniques in archaeology, epigraphy, art history and museum
conservation. Additionally, Roger Michel, the Executive Director of IDA has restated the Institute’s
purpose as follows: “The Institute for Digital Archaeology seeks to provide an optimistic and
constructive response to the ongoing threats to history and heritage . . . aim[ing] to highlight the
potential for the triumph of human ingenuity over violence by offering innovative, technology-driven
options for the stewardship of objects and architecture from our shared past.” See IDA,
http://digitalarchaeology.org.uk (last accessed Mar. 1, 2016).
114 Id.
115 Francesco Bandarin, Assistant Director-General for Culture, UNESCO; See Karissa
Rosenfield, Harvard and Oxford Take On ISIS with Digital Preservation Campaign, ARCHDAILY,
(Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.archdaily.com/772902/harvard-and-oxford-take-on-isis-with-digitalpreservation-campaign/.
116 Id.
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creativity of its people, and encouragement of individual creativity
and its dissemination as a sine qua non for progress.117
Copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate expressive
works of art.118
Cultural institutes benefit economically and commercially from the digitization
of collections. Image permissions generate revenue for the museum, and the ability
to reproduce and control access to works in their collection increase the profitability
and notoriety of any particular museum. Under the guise of copyright law, museums
limit access to collections and create a financial burden for the public seeking to use a
work. However, for those works that have fallen squarely in the public domain, the
museum’s ability to enforce these subsequent copyrights over the digital file of the
work physically in their collection is something of a legal fallacy. Museums argue
that the digitized work is a derivative work or a new creation over which they seek
the protection of copyright; however, while not specifically adopted by the legislature
or by the Supreme Court, District Courts have firmly held that no such copyright
exists over digital reproductions. Despite the courts’ finding to the contrary,
museums continue to operate under guarded and limiting copyright policies, the
ultimate result of which has been the degradation in production of scholarly works
and the shrinking framework of the public domain.
One major development enabling widespread access to art, culture, and heritage
is the Google Cultural Institute's “Google Art Project,” which provides museums with
the ability to display and archive their collections online, while simultaneously
making them accessible to viewers around the world. 119 However, many museum
collections feature works that cannot be seen through the service due to “copyright

117 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook:
Law, Policy and Use, WIPO Publication No. 489(E), available at www.wipo.int (accessed: July 2015).
118 Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873, 874 (2012).
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526
(1994). The Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., addressed the Copyright Act's primary objective,
which is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the
public good. Id. Furthermore, Fogerty establishes that copyright law ultimately serves the purpose
of enriching the general public through access to creative works, and points out that “it is peculiarly
important that the law's boundaries be demarcated as clearly as possible.” Id. at 518; see also Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). Copyright law is intended to grant valuable and enforceable rights to
authors to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary and artistic works of lasting
benefit to the world. The copyright protects originality rather than novelty or invention, as
originality is the sine qua non of copyright as well as being a constitutional requirement. Id. at 202.
To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. Original, as the term is
used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author and that it
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. Originality does not signify novelty; a work
may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous,
not the result of copying. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 342 (1991)
(interpreting the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution). See also 17 U.S.C. § 102
(2012). On its most basic terms, copyright is comprised of a bundle of rights awarded to the author
of an “original work of authorship” that is “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” This bundle
of rights includes the exclusive right to reproduce, the right to distribute copies, the right to publicly
perform, the right to publicly display, and, the right to create derivative works for a limited time.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305.
119 Phillip Kennicott, National Treasures: Google Art Project Unlocks Riches Of World's
Galleries, WASHINGTON POST, (Feb. 1, 2011).
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restrictions on the pieces,” whether or not a valid copyright exists.120 When the
project was launched, it was touted as a huge boom for freedom of information and
cultural connectivity; yet, if one were to explore any of the museums on Google Art
currently, there are many blurred rectangles where paintings should be as the result
of a copyright system that prevents the public from viewing artworks. 121
The right of reproduction is particularly of interest to cultural institutions in the
stages of acquisition, preservation, and dissemination of their collections.
Additionally, the rights to perform or display the copyrighted work publicly may also
have an impact on the policy of these institutions. 122 Museums argue that digital
reproductions of cultural heritage, for legal purposes, should be considered either
“derivative works” or “original works.” as the true “original works," the cultural
heritage artifacts, are often in the public domain, those who desire access to these
works argue that any creation or use of these subsequent digital reproductions
constitute a “fair use.”123
E. International Law & Treaties
While this comment focuses on the legal ramifications of these issues through
the lens of the copyright laws of the United States, it should not be ignored that other
international standards also influence this discussion.124 Although international
treaties125 and conventions as well as enabling domestic laws have been adopted and
120 Cait Munro, A Tumblr Chronicles Google Art Project Copyright Fails, ARTNET NEWS, (June
23, 2014), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/a-tumblr-chronicles-google-art-project-copyright-fails46507.
121 Caitlin DeWey, Google’s Quest to Make Art Available to Everyone was Foiled by Copyright
Concerns, WASHINGTON POST, (Mar. 4, 2015).
122 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means: (1) to perform or
display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside
of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise
communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public,
by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the
performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times. Furthermore, to “transmit” a performance or display is “to communicate it by any
device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.”
Id.
123 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) provides, in relevant part, that fair use is to be evaluated using four
factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2012). However, this area of the law is historically known for its relatively low levels of regulation
and the Court’s natural inclination to avoid coming to any determinative conclusion on the matter is
neither informing nor clear.
124 See Marilyn Phelan, A Synopsis of the Laws Protecting Our Cultural Heritage, 28 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 63 (1993).
125 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (An ‘international agreement’ is: (1) the Universal Copyright
Convention; (2) the Geneva Phonograms Convention; (3) the Berne Convention; (4) the WTO
Agreement; (5) the WIPO Copy Treaty; (6) the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty; and (7)
any other copyright treaty to which the United States is a party); The WIPO Copyright and
Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act of 1998 requires that paragraph (5) of

[15:604 2016] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

626

enacted, the issue of preserving cultural heritage through technology remains
germane.126 Similarly, although efforts have been made to prevent the theft and
destruction of cultural heritage, for example by criminal sanctions, the issue has not
yet been resolved.127 While questions arise when international law and protection
are not always consistent with U.S. practices and regulations, that discussion is
outside of the scope of this comment.128
the definition of “international agreement” take effect upon entry into force of the WIPO Copyright
Treaty with respect to the United States, which occurred March 6, 2002. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860, 2877; The WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation
Act of 1998 amended section 101 by adding the definition of “international agreement.” Pub. L. No.
105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2861.
126 “International law” is the universal body of law that applies to all states regardless of their
specific cultures, belief systems, and political organizations. The sources of international law are
treaty and custom. Where there is no treaty and no contending executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to customs and usages of “civilized nations.” See BARBARA T.
HOFFMAN, ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (Barbara T. Hoffman ed.,
2009). A prevailing custom of international law is one that arises from “a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinion juris).” See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES SECTION 102(2) (1987).
International Treaties including: CONVENTION FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF INTANGIBLE CULTURAL
HERITAGE, Oct. 17, 2003, 2368 U.N.T.S. 3; The 1970 UNESCO Convention; Reforming the Cultural
Property Export and Import Act; The 1954 Hague Convention. See also, United States v. Schultz,
178 F.Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 333 F.3d (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1106 (2004)
(at issue in this case was the validity of enforcing foreign patrimony laws in the United States courts
under the National Stolen Property Act); National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (“NSPA”),
an Act of Congress which prohibits certain offenses relating to stolen property and forgery. In
general, the Act prohibits the interstate or international transportation of the proceeds of theft and
certain types of forged securities, as well as the receipt or fencing of stolen property, forged
securities, or tools for forging securities. The definitions related to the Act are codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2311 and the offense are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315.
127 Criminal Sanctions in the United States include: The National Stolen Property Act (NSPA);
The Archeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA); The Federal Anti-Smuggling Statute; State
Laws for Recovery of Stolen Property; The Native American Grave Protection Act (NAGPRA);
Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA); Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); The
Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural Sculpture or Murals Act; The
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act (RICO Dragnet); Criminal Sanctions Under NSPA.
18 U.S.C. § 2311.
128 Many international treaties express an outright commitment to the preservation of cultural
heritage. By way of example, the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict states in its preamble, “Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging
to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people
makes its contribution to the culture of the world[.]” Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240. Similarly, the Convention
concerning Protection of World Cultural Heritage provides:
Considering that deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural or
natural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all the
nations of the world, Considering that the existing international conventions,
recommendations and resolutions concerning cultural and natural property
demonstrate the importance, for all the peoples of the world, of safeguarding this
unique and irreplaceable property, to whatever people it may belong, Considering
that parts of the cultural or natural heritage are of outstanding interest and
therefore need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a
whole . . . .
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, preamble, Nov.
16, 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151.
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III. ANALYSIS
The policy goals of copyright are consistent with the notion behind the efforts of
digitization of cultural heritage and the application of new media in the furtherance
thereof. The ultimate beneficiary of access to digital heritage is the public, “from
individuals who are captivated by a book or film to libraries that collect and provide
access to our cultural heritage for communities around the country.” 129 New media
technologies can: provide unprecedented levels of access and distribution; enhance
understanding and interest through contextualization and participation; illustrate
relationships between culture, artists, patrons, and between the object and the
viewer; provide insight into the social, economic, political, and geographical
environment; and preserve the heritage and its meaning. 130 Cultural institutions
also stand to benefit from the digitization and new media applications of works of
cultural heritage,131 as digital heritage serves as a valuable tool to promote and foster
understanding by engaging visitors and adding to the experience and appreciation for
the heritage of any culture.132
Copyright in this context presents a problem and not a solution, a barrier and
not a protection, dissuasion of creation and not encouragement and incentive.
Defining the legal scope and reach of digital property and new media within the
realm of art and cultural heritage law is critical for the benefit of creators, users,
consumers, cultures, and society as a whole. Unless a modification is made, or a
solution adopted, the problems presented by legal uncertainties and inadequacies
will only continue to hinder copyright’s main purpose and underlying policy.
First, the economic incentive for cultural institutions to digitize and take on new
media projects may be undermined and frustrated by the imposition of additional
and substantial financial burdens upon potential subsequent creators in the licensing
and use of material derived from existing works. Second, creators—primarily
129 Copyright Policy, Creativity, And Innovation In The Digital Economy, The Department Of
Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, led by the UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
(USPTO) and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (NTIA) at 3
(July 2013), available at www.uspto.gov/news /publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf (The Green
Paper on Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy is an assessment of
current copyright & internet related policies).
130 CREEBER & MARTIN, supra note 13; Dave, supra note 10, at 40 (virtual heritage projects
incorporate digital interactivity and media-rich representations to offer passages through time and
space that are qualitatively different from what may be possible using traditional media and
narratives).
131 R.J. Loomis, S.M. Elias & M. Wells, Website Availability And Visitor Motivation: An
Evaluation Study For The Colorado Digitization Project, 2003, Unpublished Report, Fort Collins,
CO:
Colorado
State
University,
available
at
http://www.cdpheritage.org/
resource/reports/loomisreport.pdf (Research has revealed that 70% of people visiting a museum
website would subsequently be more likely to go to the “real” museum to visit).
132 DAVID LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS A FOREIGN COUNTRY (Cambridge University Press, 1985)
(Objects are a part of the study of human history because they provide a concrete basis for ideas,
and can validate them. Their preservation demonstrates a recognition of the necessity of the past
and of the things that tell its story. Preserved objects also validate memories; while digital
acquisition techniques can provide a technological solution that is able to acquire the shape and the
appearance of artifacts with an unprecedented precision in human history, the actuality of the
object, as opposed to a reproduction, draws people in and gives them a literal way of touching the
past.).
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scholars and artists—may be deterred from producing new works under the
exception carved out in the Copyright Act for “fair use,” 133 opting instead to abandon
new projects that would otherwise incorporate existing works, due to the risk of
potential copyright infringement liability or threat of litigation. Third, the public
interest is harmed from the diminution of the public domain due to jealously guarded
and access-prohibitive policies as a result of uncertainty over copyright ownership
and status.
The ambiguous and unknown state of law in this respect has led to the
discouragement of creation and collaboration as well as resulted in scholarly works to
go unfinished, unpublished, and abandoned as a result of legal uncertainties and fear
of litigation.134 Research and scholarship is stifled and hindered, when museums do
not adhere to open access practices, and instead enforce high licensing fees and
restrictive permissions. The inability to use works physically owned by museums
and seemingly subject to copyright law protection, is prohibitory in practice due to an
inability to obtain permissions for use or excessive and overly burdensome fees. 135
Those seeking to use or reproduce cultural heritage have indicated that the possible
“risk of liability for copyright infringement, however remote, is enough to prompt

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
COLLEGE ART ASSOCIATION REPORT, Copyright, Permissions, and Fair Use Among Visual
Artists and the Academic and Museum Visual Arts Communities (Feb. 2014), available at
http://www.collegeart.org/pdf/FairUseIssuesReport.pdf. This report discusses the concerns shared
by visual arts professionals, namely art historians, and the negative impact on their ability, or
inability, to complete and carryout scholarship. While the fundamentally visual nature of their
discipline raises particular concerns among various scholars and historians of art, artists, editors,
publishers, professors, and museum curators, experts say these fears are shared across academe.
The report further states: “The visual arts communities of practice share a common problem in their
confusion about and misunderstanding of the nature of copyright law and the availability of fair
use.” Id. The report continues, discussing the concept of a form of “self-censorship” in the work of
these industry professionals which “is constrained and censored, most powerfully by themselves,
because of the confusion and the resulting fear and anxiety." Id. Part of the report includes a
survey of College Art Association (“CAA”) members, finding that one-third had avoided or
abandoned a project due to an "actual or perceived inability to obtain permission to use third-party
works." Within that group, 39% of academics said they had done so; however, editors and publishers
were the most affected group, with 57% reported dropping a project. Moreover, in addition to
abandoned projects, the Report asserts copyright confusion and failure to employ fair use laws in the
visual arts also result in: unnecessary delay and expense; subordination of creative decision-making
to the availability of creative materials and cooperativeness of providers; and failure to innovate in
the digital environment. Id.
135 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985). As the
Court in Harper & Row explained, copyright “is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors
and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.” Thus, promoting public access
to information is as important to intellectual property policy as creative incentives. Furthermore, a
healthy public domain is essential to a healthy intellectual property regime. As the Court stated in
Harper & Row, “copyright is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge.”
471 U.S. at 545. Therefore, in order to reap these benefits, the public must not only be permitted to
make certain uses of works during the copyright term, but must also have access in order to make
use of these works through public consumption, study, and re-exposition after the works enter the
public domain.
133
134
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them simply to not make use of the work.” 136 The U.S. Copyright Office has even
expressly observed that “[s]uch an outcome is not in the public interest.”137
The mandate of modern museums and cultural institutions alike is to collect,
preserve, and present objects and cultural heritage for the public to appreciate,138 the
constantly changing needs and interests of the surrounding culture and
environments—economic, political, and scholarly—continually shape the museums’
direction and its contents. Those charged with the fate of cultural heritage are often
confronted with legal obstacles that fundamentally stifle the mission and objectives
of an institution.139 The traditional viewpoint of museums is that intellectual
property laws, specifically copyright laws, have not enabled their task as a
disseminator of knowledge and culture, but rather have inhibited the museum’s
ability to carry out their mission and mandate.140
Retroactively, new media can foster a better understanding of cultures that exist
now only in the history books. Recreating and providing a virtual environment can
capture a multi-dimensional, multi-faceted, experiential, and interactive
understanding of: tangible elements, such as buildings, monuments, and objects;
intangible elements, such as custom and ritual; spatial and geographical elements; as
well as temporal layers of history and information. The benefits of virtual
exhibitions and augmented reality as a means to capture cultural heritage provide an
incredible departure from the sequentially and a linearly ordered solitary objects on
shelves behind glass inherent in the traditional museum. With the use of new media,
the temporal, spatial, and subjective nature limited by the physical and aesthetic
experience of the traditional museum can be transformed into a dynamic, interactive,
informed, multidimensional, participatory, and educational experience for the public.
The creation of a new media project is costly in terms of both time and data.
Labor-intensive resources required from artists and scholars in order to provide the
density of information and design that go into each aspect and detail of a given
project. The processes and resources required to create these new media renderings
include: image and object licensing and permissions fees; and costs associated with
software purchase, maintenance, and updates, as well as data storage and
publication.

136 U.S. Copyright Office, Report On Orphan Works 1, 15 (Jan. 2006), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf.
137 Id.
138 Susan A. Crane, The Conundrum of Ephemerality: Time, Memory, and Museums, 39 A
COMPANION TO MUSEUM STUDIES: BLACKWELL COMPANIONS IN CULTURAL STUDIES 98 (Sharon
Macdonald ed., 2011).
139 Pantalony, supra note 20, at 9 (World Intellectual Property Organization 2013) (“the ability
to operate in the digital environment may provide a way forward. So long as IP rights are
understood and well managed, it may not take a great deal of funding to create meaningful online
educational programming available to the public, while at the same time meeting the objective of
preserving regional cultural heritage collections.”).
140 Id. at 5.
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A. Digitization of Cultural Collections
Strict adherence to the principles of copyright law would make the routine
digital archiving of cultural heritage legally prohibitive, monetarily 141 inequitable, or
overly time-consuming.142 When works of cultural heritage that may, in and of
themselves, not qualify for copyright protection, are translated and documented,
through the use of technology, creating an exact replica or digital facsimile of the
work—on whatever scale—it is unclear whether a new, now copyrightable work has
been created. The underlying work is generally non-copyrightable, the primary
reason being that these works reside in the public domain. The information that is
attached to these multi-layered digital works is also non-copyrightable because it is
factual. While there has clearly been a significant investment in the creation of a
digital heritage work, “originality,” not “sweat of the brow,” is the touchstone for
copyright protection in fact-based works under the Copyright Act of 1909 and 1976
revisions; copyright rewards originality, not effort.143
Under U.S. copyright law, the owner is granted the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works.144 However, this right is not a subdivision of the right to
reproduce; rather, under the Copyright Act, a derivative work is:
based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation,
or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship, is a “derivative work.”145
Furthermore, as clarified by the Copyright Act:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished
from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not
imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright
in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the
scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright
protection in the preexisting material. 146
If the text of the Copyright Act does not shed enough light on the issue, which it
arguably does not, case law has further established that the migration from one
format to another does not result in or create a “new work.” In other words, the
This assumes that any copyright holder offered a license in the first instance.
The time consideration referenced is that of the labor intensive task of locating and
contacting each copyright holder from which an institution may seek permission or license.
143 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; Act March 4, 1909, § 1 et seq., 35 Stat. 1075; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8,
cl. 8, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
144 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
145 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added).
146 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012).
141
142
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retransmission of a work in another medium is not a sufficient basis for any claim of
transformation.147 Furthermore, in New York Times Co. v. Tasini, the Supreme
Court explained that the long-embraced doctrine of “media neutrality,” mandates
that the “transfer of a work between media does not alter the character of that work
for copyright purposes.”148
B. The “Right” to Access
Society has a right to the diverse artistic heritage of the world, “even if access
must be achieved by setting new public policy goals that push back against the
ownership rights of market-driven cultural industries.”149 With digital media, the
curation and exhibition of complex knowledge is simplified by the ability to present
multi-layered and multi-dimensional information in ways that have otherwise been
impossible. Not only can new media provide a platform for users around the world to
experience and examine two-dimensional works, technology now ventures into the
third-dimension, presenting the user with the ability to examine all aspects of the
object, and even in some cases, through the utilization of three-dimensional printing,
the ability to physically hold an object of cultural heritage in a museum that is across
the globe.150 Furthermore, new media can offer the ability to explore in the
147 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding
that a “space shift” of sound recordings on CDS to and MP3 format was not a fair use in that the
unauthorized copies were being retransmitted in another medium, which is an insufficient basis for
any legitimate claim of transformation); see also Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104,
108 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting fair use defense by operator of a service that retransmitted copyrighted
radio broadcasts over telephone lines); Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1105, 1111 (1990) (repetition of copyrighted material that “merely repackages or republishes
the original” is unlikely to be deemed a fair use).
148 New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 502 (2001); see also Faulkner v. Nat'l
Geographic Enterprises, Inc., 409 F.3d 26, 40 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that the transfer of a work from
one medium to another generally does not alter its character for copyright purposes); Greenberg v.
Nat'l Geographic Soc., 533 F.3d 1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that electronic collection was
privileged “revision” of the original works when magazine published searchable electronic collection
of its prior issues, which included photographer's copyrighted pictures). See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(2012) (noting that “[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”) (emphasis added). See also Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 55 (1884). See also Walter Benjamin’s 1936 essay, “The Work of Art in
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” which constitutes one of the earliest reflections of the way in
which the cultural experience and interpretation is transformed by the advent of what were then the
“new” media technologies (photography and film). Benjamin directs attention to the way in which
these technologies release cultural objects from their unique presence in a place and make them
uniformly available irrespective of spatial location. The way in which old media technologies
apparently obliterate the place of cultural objects is also a feature of new media. However, the
apparent obliteration of place that occurs in this way is in itself problematic, giving rise to a loss of
the sense of spatial and temporal distance, and so of the relative “locatedness” of both experiencing
subject and interpreted object. The loss of sense of the place of the object threatens a loss of the
sense of place of the subject, and with it, a loss of a proper sense of heritage as such.
149 IVEY, supra note 80.
150 Addison, supra note 7, at 28 (As information technology has grown, 3D documentation tolls,
from electronic surveying instruments to laser scanners, photogrammatic cameras, and even CAD
modellers, have brought more and more heritage data into the digital domain). From vivid
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fourth-dimension: time. An additional layer of information can be presented in the
form of interactive timelines and the ability to view one or more objects at various
times throughout history.151 “Virtual exhibitions” and comprehensive recreations
allow the user to navigate entire cities and sites from anywhere in the world.
Cultural heritage institutions, as well as the public, stand to benefit immensely from
the digitization of cultural heritage housed within institutions globally. The
restrictive practices of museums and private collectors impede the purposes of the
public domain by controlling access to the original work of art and claiming copyright
protection over digital reproductions of collections.
C. Museums and Cultural Institutions
1. Restrictive Museum Policies – Copyright Misuse?
Returning for a moment to the two German artists and the “illegal” scan of the
bust of Nefertiti—while Neues Museum’s policy in essentially “hoarding” cultural
heritage is only one example, this unfortunately is not an isolated practice.
Museums are in a position to profit immensely from their collections. Monetarily,
profits may be realized in the form of licensing fees for those wishing to use an image
for one purpose or another, royalties derived from replicas and memorabilia, and

pixel-based visuals to accurate scanner-produced dimensions, GPS locations and various
environmental parameters, digital capture devices have enabled us to document and record at new
levels of detail and precision. Id. at 29. Furthermore, interactive multimedia presentations
featuring animated (e.g. Flash), 3D (e.g. VRML), or panoramic (e.g. QTVR) elements have become
the norm, and museum/site kiosks and VR theatres are becoming more common. Id.
151 For example, new media and technology can be used to show the Pantheon, emblematic in its
own right as it stands today, however, a complete appreciation of the structure can only be
ascertained when one knows and understands the history behind its existence. New media and
technology can offer this understanding in an easy-to-digest way. The Pantheon can be viewed at
and during its construction, with the original decoration and adornment, after the Catholic
Reformation changed all of the sculptures and added new meanings to the various aspects of the
physical structure, and as the Pantheon appears today, in addition to the various changes that have
been made to the physical construction and appearance, as the structure has weathered with age as
well as how the structure has stood the test of time. Furthermore, the Pantheon, like all objects,
artifacts, and cultural heritage sites, does not exist in a vacuum, and in order to gain a full
understanding, must be viewed within the physical and spatial context of its surroundings: within
the people and culture of the different times, as the structure stands in relation to other buildings
and monuments, the environment and coordination and relative placement and function within the
city as a whole. Furthermore, the respective roles played by the structure throughout time must
also be appreciated: how the structure functioned at its inception, how different people of different
times and cultures interacted and interact with the building, the structure’s role as an active
participant in ceremonial and social contexts, and its importance as an iconic symbol,
accomplishment, and achievement of a people. All of these aspects are then supplemented with
user-generated content in the form of images, stories, experiences, ideas, notes, thoughts,
understandings, and so forth. New media, technology, and the Internet make this type of
unprecedented access and understanding available to the masses in a way that has never been
imagined.
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through museum membership and admission costs. 152 From another perspective,
institutions also have an interest in guarding and controlling how their collections
are viewed and used. The appeal, notoriety, and prestige of an institution can be
influenced by the decision to follow or adopt an open policy or to jealously guard and
limit access to the particular work or collection.
While the doctrine of copyright misuse has yet to be formally recognized by the
U.S. Supreme Court, it is recognized and well-defined in several circuits as an
affirmative defense to infringement. The copyright misuse doctrine “forbids the use
of the copyright to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the
Copyright Office.”153 The defense is often applied when a defendant can prove either:
“(1) a violation of the antitrust laws; (2) that the copyright owner otherwise illegally
extended its monopoly; or (3) that the copyright owner violated the public policies
underlying the copyright laws.”154 While the courts have discussed copyright misuse
in only a handful of published opinions, and have “applied the doctrine sparingly,”155
copyright misuse is a valid defense, “the contours of which are still being defined.”156
To motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors for the sake of the
public's benefit, copyrights are limited in time and scope. 157 “Implicit in this
rationale is the assumption that in the absence of such public benefit, the grant of a
copyright monopoly to individuals would be unjustified.” 158 The defense of copyright
misuse involves the question of whether a copyright is being used in a manner
“violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.” 159 The Ninth
Circuit expressly adopted copyright misuse as an equitable defense to a claim of
infringement,160 noting “copyright misuse does not invalidate a copyright, but
precludes its enforcement during the period of misuse.”161
The doctrine of copyright misuse is limited in this regard, as the application first
requires the existence of a valid copyright. Thus, the determination of whether a
valid copyright over a museum’s digital recreation of works in its collection is
essential in assessing the applicability of this equitable defense.

152 For example, in 2014, the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation produced a limited edition
of 100 painted 3-D-printed copies of the Nefertiti bust at the Replica Workshop of the National
Museums of Berlin and sold the replicas for 8,900 euros (about $9,650) each. Wilder, supra note 91.
153 Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir.1990).
154 Soc'y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 65 (1st Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1315 (2013).
155 Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir.2011) (the purpose of copyright
misuse is to prevent “holders of copyrights from leveraging their limited monopoly to allow them
control of areas outside the monopoly”).
156 MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 (9th Cir. 2010).
157 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
158 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (2014).
159 Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir.1990).
160 Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir.
1997).
161 Id.; see also Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing
the Fifth Circuit's discussion of copyright misuse “as an unclean hands defense which forbids the
use of the copyright to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Copyright
Office and which is contrary to public policy to grant”).
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2. Physical Ownership Versus Copyright Ownership
Many of the artworks held by cultural institutions are in the public domain—
either because they were created before the late 17th and early 18th centuries, when
copyright law came into existence, or any original copyrights have expired.
Additionally, for works that are still protected by copyright, the museum that owns
the physical artwork typically does not also hold the copyright to that work.
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
entirely distinct from the ownership of any physical or material object in which the
work is embodied.162 A copyright is independent of both its physical manifestation
and the very thing that is copyrighted.163 Furthermore, a copyright is not identical to
a copyrighted work, but exists separately as the intangible right to exclude all others
from printing, publishing, copying, or vending the work.164
Institutions that have engaged in digitization practices often argue that the
exact digital replica or scans are eligible for copyright protection. However, despite
the fact that these works technically belong to the public domain, restrictive museum
practices prevent this from happening in reality. By limiting access to cultural
heritage, the final goal of copyright is hindered. Inside of museums, once access has
been granted to patrons and museumgoers, there are additional boundaries in place
which further limit individuals’ access. Some museums—on the far end of the
“anti-access” spectrum—have adopted policies that prohibit not only photography,
but sketching, as well.165 Recently, however, an increasing number of museums are
opening up and allowing the public to access their collections remotely, as many have
taken steps to digitize collections and make these digital archives available for
download.
As explored earlier, the copyright laws of the United States do not reward
“sweat of the brow” efforts.166 This is not, however, to say that these institutions
should not receive any benefit or protection for their efforts; rather, it simply
suggests that perhaps copyright law is not where these protections should originate.
3. The “Originality” Requirement, as told by Bridgeman v. Corel167
In Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corporation,168 the district court for the
Southern District of New York upheld the public's right to access and use of public
See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 240 (5th Cir. 1982).
164 17 U.S.C. § 27 (2012); see Lantern Press, Inc. v. Am. Publishers Co., 419 F. Supp. 1267, 1271
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (“Section 27 was directed to making clear the idea that the copyright was not
identical with the copyrighted work but existed separately from it as the intangible right to exclude
all others from printing, publishing, copying or vending the work.”).
165 Flash photography is prohibited almost universally; however, this prohibition is more for the
preservation interests of the artwork than for reasons of copyright.
166 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 342 (1991).
167 The federal district court in Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (hereinafter “Bridgeman I”), on recons., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(hereinafter “Bridgeman II”).
168 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), on recons.,
36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
162
163
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domain works of art, in finding that exact photographic reproductions of public
domain works of art are not copyrightable. 169 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd.
(hereinafter “Bridgeman”) was a company in the business of acquiring the rights to
market digital reproductions of public domain artworks owned by museums and
other collections; Bridgeman maintained a library of those reproductions in the form
of digital files, and profited off of those files through licensing.170 Bridgeman
transformed photographic transparencies of numerous artworks into digital image
files and claimed that they held the exclusive rights to those reproductions.171 The
defendant, Corel Corporation (“Corel”), a Canadian computer software company, was
marketing a CD-ROM set containing hundreds of digital reproductions of famous
paintings by European masters.172 Bridgeman, claiming that it held copyrights in
these reproductions, brought suit against Corel, contending that over one hundred of
Corel’s digital images were of paintings for which Bridgeman claimed the exclusive
rights.173
The key element upon which this case hinged was “originality.”174 Bridgeman,
as the plaintiff, needed to prove—under either British or U.S. law—that its
reproductions were sufficiently “original” that they qualified for copyright
protection.175 While Bridgeman never contested the fact that the original artworks
were in the public domain, it maintained that the digital copies of these works
possessed sufficient originality, in and of themselves, to qualify for copyright
protection.176
Bridgeman advanced several arguments in support of its claim that these digital
copies were sufficiently original, two of which are particularly relevant to the topic of
this comment. First, Bridgeman argued that the change in medium—from painting
to photograph—that occurred as it copied the paintings, rendered the digital
reproductions sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection. 177 The court, in
rejecting Bridgeman’s argument stated, “the mere reproduction of a work of art in a
different medium should not constitute the required originality.”178
Second,
Bridgeman asserted that the photography itself constituted an inherently original
practice, arguing “photography requires artistic talent and originality and therefore
would have the court conclude that its transparencies—photographs of underlying
works of art—are original.”179 Unsurprisingly, the court rejected this argument as
well, “one need not deny the creativity inherent in the art of photography to recognize
Id.
Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Bridgeman I, 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 427, n.41 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“A work is original if it owes its
creation to the author and was not merely copied. With respect to derivative works, the originality
requirement warrants that there be a distinguishable variation between the work in which
copyright is sought and the underlying work. Important to this calculus is that the demonstration of
some physical, as opposed to artistic, skill does not constitute a ‘distinguishable variation.’” [internal
citations omitted]).
175 Id. at 426.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 427.
179 Bridgeman I, 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 427, n.41 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
169
170

[15:604 2016] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

636

that a photograph which is no more than a copy of the work of another as exact as
science and technology permit lacks originality. That is not to say such a feat is
trivial, simply not original. The more persuasive analogy is that of a photocopier.”180
The court rejected all of Bridgeman’s arguments, and granted summary
judgment in favor of Corel—once pursuant to British law, and then again pursuant to
U.S. law. In both opinions, the court explicitly held that a change in medium, alone,
does not confer sufficient originality so as to entitle a work to copyright protection; in
other words, “the change of medium is immaterial.”181 The court further explained
that a copy in a new medium is only copyrightable where “a copier makes some
identifiable original contribution.”182 The court, in its discussion, paid close attention
to the fact that, in an effort to create accurate, high-resolution, true to life, and exact
digital facsimiles of the works in its collection, Bridgeman not only failed to make
such an “original” contribution, but actively took great pains to avoid doing so. 183
The court expressly addressed the overarching policy of copyright law, “[a]bsent
a genuine difference between the underlying work of art and the copy of it for which
protection is sought, the public interest in promoting progress in the arts—indeed,
the constitutional demand—could hardly be served.”184
The court dismissed
Bridgeman’s copyright infringement claim on the grounds that “the allegedly
infringed works—color transparencies of paintings which themselves are in the
public domain—were not original and therefore not permissible subjects of valid
copyright.”185
As the District Court found in Bridgeman and the Supreme Court indicated in
Feist, “sweat of the brow” alone is not the “creative spark” which is the sine qua non
of originality.186 Case law and copyright policy resoundingly suggest that the digital
replications of physical works of art in the collections of museums are not eligible for
copyright protection. While the court in Bridgeman found that expertly faithful
photographic reproductions of two-dimensional works, which themselves belong to
the public domain, do not have the requisite amount of originality to be protected by
copyright, the court’s reasoning suggests that any accurate reproduction of a
two-dimensional work would fail for lack of originality under Feist, regardless of
whether or not the copied works are in the public domain.
In the context of recreating cultural heritage artifacts by taking photographs
and rendering the photographs into three-dimensional computer automated design
files, the issue becomes whether these image compilations are sufficiently creative
and original, or transformative, to vest copyright ownership in the creator or
co-creators of these projects.
Id.
Bridgeman II, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 199; Bridgeman I, 25 F. Supp. at 427 (“The mere
reproduction of a work of art in a different medium should not constitute the required originality for
the reason that no one can claim to have independently evolved any particular medium. As
discussed above, the law requires “some element of material alteration or embellishment” to the
totality of the work. At bottom, the totality of the work is the image itself, and Bridgeman
admittedly seeks to duplicate exactly the images of the underlying works.”).
182 Bridgeman II, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
183 Bridgeman I, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
184 Bridgeman II, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 196; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
185 Bridgeman I, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 421; Bridgeman II, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 192.
186 Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.
180
181
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4. In Practice: Contract law disguised as Copyright law
Museum claims over the use and reuse of works from their collections, while
often labeled and understood as “copyright claims,” are in reality primarily a matter
of contractual agreements, licenses, and the exercise of control over access to the
many works that museums hold. Although outside the scope of this article, it is
worth noting that in this context, an additional concern is raised as to the legality
and enforceability of these restrictive museum practices. As copyright is a federal
law, and the laws governing contracts are common law, or state-based law, it is
possible that a preemption issue arises when contract law frustrates the
constitutional mandate of the “public domain.”
D. Outside of Museums
Three-dimensional scanning technologies as well as other new media
applications to cultural heritage have applications far beyond the walls of museums.
“Right now there’s this boom of 3-D scanning to reproduce cultural heritage,” said
Morehshin Allahyari, an Iranian-born artist who uses new media and scanning
technologies to recreate artifacts that have been destroyed by ISIS, “[b]ut few people
are talking about who the images belong to.”187 Although it may be a good thing that
few people are talking about to whom these images and projects belong, and are
focusing more on what really matters—the fact that these projects are being carried
out, working to save antiquity—the few people that are talking about them, are not
as “pro-access for all” as the public would hope. In terms of the copyrightability of
works in the public domain transformed into a new media format, it is unclear
whether any protections will be granted at all.
This issue has been considered by a district court, however that decision was
limited to the applicability to two-dimensional works on paper. In United States v.
Elcon Ltd. (hereinafter “Elcon”), the Northern District of California made the
determination that copyright law:
does not “prevent access to matters in the public domain” or allow any
publisher to remove from the public domain and acquire rights in any
public domain work.
Nothing within the [Digital Millennium
Copyright Act] grants any rights to anyone in any public domain
work. A public domain work remains in the public domain and no
party has any intellectual property right in the expression of that
work.188
The defendant in Elcon raised the scenario involving a situation in which the
only available version of a public domain work was an electronic version, protected by
technical measures.189 In responding to this presumption, the court addressed the
scenario with a rather definitive answer:
Wilder, supra note 91.
United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
189 Id.
187
188
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If a work is in the public domain, any person may make use of that
expression, for whatever purposes desired. To the extent that a
publisher has taken a public domain work and made it available in
electronic form, and in the course of doing so has also imposed use
restrictions on the electronic version, the publisher has not gained
any lawfully protected intellectual property interest in the work. The
publisher has only gained a technological protection against copying
that particular electronic version of the work.190
The court’s decision answered this question in holding that publishing a public
domain work in a restricted format does not remove the work from the public
domain, even if in doing so it allows the publisher to control that particular electronic
copy.191 Pointing to Congress’ role in copyright, and implying a potential need for
legislative measures to be taken, the court went on to say, “[i]f this is an evil in the
law, the remedy is for Congress to prohibit use or access restrictions from being
imposed upon public domain works.” 192 The Court next pointed to the public’s role in
determining and influencing these issues, “perhaps, if left to the market, the
consuming public could decline to purchase public domain works packaged with use
restrictions.”193
Interestingly enough, it is likely that, of all of the various applications of new
media to cultural heritage discussed thus far, these works are the most likely to be
eligible for copyright protection. On the flip side, these works are also the most
important for the public and museums to have a right to access, as they no longer
exist in the physical form.
E. Integrity and Authenticity
Apart from questions of ownership and authorship, especially within the context
of third-party user contributions and content, the creator of digitized cultural
heritage must also be responsible for the data quality and quantity, as well as the
authenticity of the media.194 The reduction of an artifact to a digital replica, some
argue, has the potential of discounting the authenticity of the original cultural object.
Id.
Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Issues of data quantity, quality, and longevity must also be considered. Addison, supra note
7, at 27 (without careful planning, many digital efforts will not outlive the heritage they are meant
to record and protect. Following a review of the growth in the field, heritage’s universal value is
contrasted with its insular digital record. Metadata and solutions for sharing are proposed. Using
UNESCO’s Online World Heritage Portal as an example, a structure for sharing and preserving
technical, statutory, and rich media heritage content is presented.). See also LIXINSKI, supra note 4,
at 17 (the notion of authenticity in heritage in general—and intangible heritage in particular—must
also be considered when digitizing cultural heritage. While the very notion of intangible heritage
challenges the assumption that there is such a thing as “authentic” heritage, at the same time
authenticity is an important bridge between the idea of heritage as experience and its market value.
But, because “heritage experiences” focus “on sincerity, rather than facts,” it is understandable that
this consumer sensibility will exert pressure for some notion of authenticity to come into play.).
190
191
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In changing the cultural significance from a singular original physical work to a
digital copy, with the ability to be created and recreated many times over, as well as
transforming it into mere economic potential can degrade the status of the original to
a consumer good.
The determination of the ownership of the copyright in the new media works is
another question in and of itself. The answer to this question may have sweeping
effects and may determine in large part: monetary considerations; funding; and
proceeds derived from the work (museum contributions, licensing, any monies
awarded as the result of a successful lawsuit pertaining to the copyright). The
ownership of the copyright will also determine the relevant rights and
responsibilities of the parties, including: duties related to the work; maintenance;
up-keep of the project; control over content and access to the work; the right to make
or authorize reproductions and derivative works in different mediums such as
sculpture, 3D printing, virtual reality, and other multimedia platforms; the duty to
protect and patrol the copyright; and, the right and authority to destroy or authorize
the destruction of the work.
While the threat of misappropriation is a legitimate concern due to the relative
ease at which those with access can manipulate digital heritage, there are also
protective measures that can be taken in order to control and protect against this
threat.
Protection measures such as encryption, authentication, digital
fingerprinting, watermarking, and other distribution mechanisms for digital content
can provide a secure distribution system for the management of copyrighted content.
IV. PROPOSALS
The current legal structure in the United States does not effectively or efficiently
address the conflicting concerns and uncertain legalities as to the potential rights
and responsibilities of the custodians of cultural heritage and the creators and
documenters of “Digital Heritage.” In the absence of a complete legislative overhaul
of the existing intellectual property rights regime, compromises and alternative
approaches must be made within the creative arts and cultural heritage fields. The
balance between intellectual property, cultural heritage, artists’ rights, and the
public domain must be maintained as the ways in which all realms contribute to
innovation, cultural vitality, education, free speech, and scientific progress are
integral to an enriched collective culture.
The responsibility of creating an open-access structure and the promotion of
increased access must necessarily fall upon the shoulders of those who hold the
cultural heritage and upon those with access. Possible proposals to address this
downfall in the traditional legal process include the introduction of an open-ended
“fair use” exception for cultural heritage and the digital age; the adoption of “Codes of
Best Practices” and other standards; variations on moral rights; creative commons
licensing; open-source software platforms; and the adoption of a modified form of
compulsory licensing.195
195 Another possible solution may be the introduction of an open-ended fair use exception for the
digital age. While the “fair use” exception does have many advantages, the ambiguity surrounding
the defense requires clarification in order to adapt the copyright regime to the digital realm.
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A. Industry Codes of Best Practices & Adoption of Standards
In response to various uncertainties inherent within copyright law, especially
within the realm of digital and new media, many fields have adopted their own
version or interpretation of the law, in the form of “Codes of Best Practices.” 196 While
these Codes are helpful within their respective fields, they are not legally binding
and present their own set of issues.197 Furthermore, codes of best practices operate
in the “shadow” of fair use and within the gaps left in intellectual property law by the
failure to address pertinent issues. However, while they are a valuable resource in
determining an industry standard, there is no public law approval, and the Codes
have no binding legal application.
National and international standards are already in place, to some degree, in an
effort to ensure that digital heritage will be “interchangeable between systems and
institutions and sustainable in the long term, and that systems and applications will
themselves be interoperable.”198 “The transitory nature of digital technology
demands that technical standards be applied to the creation and documentation of
digital image files if they are not swiftly to become defunct.”199 Again, however,
“Balancing technological innovation and content creation depends less on the distinctions between
the fair use and fair dealing exemptions and more on ensuring that the law, through both legislation
and judicial interpretation, in fact acts to promote the main purpose of copyright law, the benefit of
the public.” Susanna Monseau, Copyright and the Digital Economy: Is It Necessary to Adopt Fair
Use?
COLLEGE
OF
NEW
JERSEY,
(Mar.
10,
2015),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.257643610.2139/ssrn.2576436 (accessed July 2015).
196 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Fed. Energy Admin., 556 F.2d 542, 552 (T.E.C.A. 1977) (observing
that an agency document that lacks formally binding effect "may have extremely important
consequences with respect to the issue of good faith reliance for future acts" and therefore constitute
"final agency action").
197 See Some Optimism About Fair Use And Copyright Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 351, as a
comprehensive article on “Code of Best Practices”:
Codes of best practices make practical the observation that the development of
knowledge and access to knowledge are inescapably social processes, in additional
to individual ones. Second, codes of best practices highlight the existence of
institutional settings for the production and re-production of knowledge. Third,
codes of best practices signify the growing significance of blended public/private
institutional forms for the development and application of law itself; "law" reform
in copyright is not exclusively a matter for public authorities, such as Congress,
courts, the Copyright Office, and international conventions. Fourth, and perhaps
most important, codes of best practices offer an affirmative vision of the role of
fair use as part of a broader project of copyright that extends beyond merely the
affirmation of proprietary rights and fair competition in markets for creative and
innovative goods, and in doing so they re-affirm that project itself.
Id. at 353.
198 HOWARD BESSER & JENNIFER TRANT, INTRODUCTION TO IMAGING: STANDARDS 7 (1997);
Bresser, Introduction to Imaging (rev. ed. 2003), http://www.getty.edu/research/publications/
electronic_publications/introimages/standards.html.
199 See Bresser, supra note 198 (“Technical standards addressing a broad range of information
technology issues, including file formats and technical metadata schemas, are maintained and
developed by international organizations. Examples include the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO); the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC); the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE); the International Telecommunications Union (ITU);
and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), which develops vendor-neutral open standards and
specifications for Internet and Web-based transactions, with the intent of promoting
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while highly valuable in the abstract and beneficial to those who adhere to these
standards, not all have any legally binding force.
B. Moral Rights
Although related, “moral rights” are separate and distinct from copyrights.
Where copyright protects an author’s economic interest, moral rights are “rights of a
spiritual, non-economic and personal nature” that exist “independently of an artist’s
copyright in his or her work” and “spring from a belief that an artist in the process of
creation injects his spirit into the work and that the artist’s personality, as well as
integrity of the work, should therefore be protected and preserved.” 200
Moral rights could offer a possible compromise between artists’ rights, museums’
interests, the culture of origin’s integrity, and the public’s right to access.201 Perhaps
the rights of attribution and integrity should be required and maintained in the
demarcation of a work, including the culture of origin and the museum presently
caring for the item. However, the moral rights question presents additional issues of
its own. For example, there is a dramatic difference in which moral rights—if any at
all—are instilled upon artists depending upon the law of each country.
Section 106A of the Copyright Act protects the rights of certain authors to
attribution and integrity.202 Although United States’ “moral rights” granted to
artists are much narrower than those overseas, under Section 106A of the Copyright
Act,
the author of a work of visual art—(1) shall have the right—(A) to
claim authorship of that work, and (B) to prevent the use of his or her
name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not
create; (2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name
as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion,
interoperability. National standards bodies—including the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), the U.S. National Information Standards Organization (NISO), the British Standards
Institution (BSI), and the German Deutsches Institut für Normung (DIN)—not only define and
endorse their own standards but also support the work of international agencies.”).
200 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995); 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012); see also
Robert Platt, A Comparative Survey of Moral Rights, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 951, 968-69 (2010).
201 In the U.S., moral rights were codified under U.S. law 17 U.S.C. § 106A in 1990 in order for
the U.S. to comply with its obligations under the Berne Convention. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). See
also Platt, supra note 200. This legislation is known as the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”).
Section 106A endows creators of qualifying works with limited moral rights, specifically the rights of
authorship and integrity for the duration of the creator’s life. VARA contains many limitations;
works of “visual art” that fall within in its protection may only constitute a “painting, drawing,
print, or sculpture,” and prints and cast sculptures must exist in numbers less than two hundred.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Further, while the right of integrity allows the creator of a qualifying work
of visual art to prevent the intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of work that would be
prejudicial to the artist’s honor, VARA only allows artists to prevent the destruction of a work if that
work is of a “recognized stature.” Still problematic, however, is that VARA specifically states that
the rights set forth therein are subject to the fair use provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). It is
unclear just how fair use applies to moral rights, and it does not appear that any court has
specifically addressed this issue.
202 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
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mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and (3) subject to the
limitations set forth in section 113 (d), shall have the right—(A) to
prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification
of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification
of that work is a violation of that right.203
Furthermore, the conflicting international laws, specifically the more
artist-friendly European Union laws, place additional confusion on the status of
artist’s rights flowing from the Moral Rights doctrine of the United States; therefore,
this proposal must also be accompanied by additional legislative acts in order to
thoroughly address these concerns.
When discussing cultural heritage on a global scale, much of which arguably
belongs to the “collective heritage to the world,” the question becomes which law
should govern: the country in which the cultural heritage object or artifact
originated, the country in which the digital media transcribing the artifact is created,
or the country in which the museum housing the artifact resides? Furthermore,
when it comes to third-party resources and user-generated content contribution,
when does the “original” artist’s work become so changed and altered by additional
content that the original “artist” is no longer the main content contributor?
C. Licensing
1. Creative Commons Licensing
Another possible solution to the problems of access to and control of cultural
heritage and “digital heritage” may be the usage of creative commons licensing,
releasing the work and providing wide access to the public, under certain limitations
or requirements.204 This proposal provides the closest balance yet seen between
powerful restriction and widespread access with retention of certain controls.205
Public licenses, also commonly referred to as "open source" licenses, may provide
a solution, or at least an answer to some of the issues posed by copyright concerns
17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
There are currently several types and variations of public licenses that have been designed
and are used to provide the creators or owners of copyrighted material a means through which to
protect and control their copyrights. Creative Commons licensing provides free copyright licenses
which allow the copyright owner to dedicate works to the public, or to license certain uses of their
works, while retaining and reserving other rights from the proverbial “copyright bundle of rights”
for themselves or their respective affiliated institutions. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2008). Recently, “open source licensing has become a widely used method of creative
collaboration that serves to advance the arts and sciences in a manner and at a pace that few could
have imagined just a few decades ago.” Id. at 1378.
205 Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (attribution and modification
transparency requirements in open source license created conditions to protect economic rights in
granting of public license, and thus the Court held that the creative commons license and its
requirements were enforceable).
203
204
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and allowing open access to information and digital heritage. 206 These common
licenses are typically used by artists, authors, educators, software developers, digital
humanities scholars, museums, historians, and scientists when creating and carrying
out collaborative projects with the intention to dedicate the work to the public.207
2. Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing is one exception that has been carved out of certain
copyright owners’ set of exclusive monopoly rights. These compulsory, or “statutory”
licensing mechanisms already exist in copyright law.208 However, they do not exist
for works of visual art. Extending this compulsory scheme to works of visual art may
be one way to address the issues presented. Similar to those compulsory licenses
that operate and apply to musical works, a similar exception could easily be applied
and extended to works of visual art, benefitting the creator, while also providing
benefit through access to the public.
Naturally, these compulsory licensing mechanisms are not favored by those
owners of copyrights to which they currently apply. 209 Furthermore, courts have also
206 Open source licensing restrictions are easily distinguished from mere "author attribution"
cases. Copyright law does not automatically protect the rights of authors to credit for copyrighted
materials. Whether such rights are protected by a specific license grant depends on the language of
the license. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Copyright law does not
automatically protect the rights of authors to credit for copyrighted materials. See Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Companies, 538 F.2d 14, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American copyright law, as
presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation,
since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal rights of authors.”); Graham
v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998) (Whether such rights are protected by a specific license
grant depends on the language of the license. Creative Commons licenses are also beneficial and
desirable, as they offer an answer to the question of collaboration and may provide a solution to
situations in which multi-disciplinary co-collaborators from all over the world, contributing
enormous amounts of information and development, are still able to “track” what author or authors
created which portion or portions of the software or information.)
207 Creative Commons licensing provides free copyright licenses which allow the copyright
owner to dedicate works to the public, or to license certain uses of their works, while retaining and
reserving other rights from the proverbial “copyright bundle of rights” for themselves or their
respective affiliated institutions. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For
example, the copyright owner may, under a Creative Commons license, grant access to the work,
and the right to copy and reproduce the work for educational purposes, while still not allowing the
person copying the work to create derivative works or alter the original in any way. Under this
license, a copyright owner may also require attribution as to the work’s source—a requirement not
inherent in the weak protections afforded to artists under the United States copyright law.
208 Compulsory Licensing in Copyright Law.
See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (limitations on exclusive
rights: secondary transmissions); id. § 115 (scope of exclusive rights in nondramatic musical works:
compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords); id. § 116 (scope of negotiated licenses
for public performance by means of coin-operated phonorecord players); id. § 119 (limitations on
exclusive rights: secondary transmissions of superstations and network stations for private home
viewing); id. § 122 (limitations on exclusive rights: secondary transmissions by satellite carriers
within local markets).
209 See Midge M. Hyman, The Socialization of Copyright: The Increased Use of Compulsory
Licenses, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105 (1985); see also Robert Stephen Lee, An Economic
Analysis of Compulsory Licensing in Copyright Law, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 203, 204-05 (1982)
(critiquing the application, in commenting, compulsory licenses “not only deny creators the exclusive
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taken the position that the compelled license is not a solution to the various issues
surrounding “access.”210 Copyright law does not exist solely to benefit and protect
content creators; rather, copyright law is a carefully-struck balance between the need
to create incentives for authorship and the interests of society in the broad
accessibility of ideas.211 However, as a balance, authorial incentive may come at the
expense of the equally important public interest. From a policy standpoint, removing
the burden from the secondary user and placing the responsibility on the industry
and those who own or claim ownership of works of art, pushes the practical
application of copyright closer to the policy goals copyright law seeks to serve, in
striking a balance between the two competing interests of incentivizing creativity
and creation and advancing the interests of society in the broad accessibility of ideas.
3. Variations of Licenses
In the United States, those who deliver and provide access to content often
emphasize contractual and voluntary licenses as the preferred vehicle to deliver
online or digital copyrighted content to the consumer. 212 These restrictions often
come in the form of “access controls.” Under U.S. law, circumventing an access
control the copyright owner places on his or her work is a violation of the law.213
However, explicit in U.S. law, circumvention and trafficking rules apply only to
works subject to copyright protection: “a work protected under this title” or “the right
of a copyright owner under this title.” 214 Therefore, the act of circumventing the
access control used to protect a reformatted version of a work that is already in the
public domain—as is most cultural heritage—should not, in theory, be a violation of
Title 17 Section 1201(a)(1)(A). Therefore, if the underlying work is not subject to
copyright protection, then circumventing access to it, or using control devices related
to it cannot, in the plain language of the statute, violate Title 17, Section 1201. 215 In
this respect, at least, the proposal of using technical measures controlling access to
materials that are in the public domain fails insofar as these controls can be legally
circumvented, as such material is not subject to protection under the Copyright Act.

right to use their work as they wish, but also require them to do business with persons not of their
own choosing and to accept statutorily established rates at statutorily mandated intervals for the
use of their works.”)
210 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (in
considering the unpublished copyrighted expression of public figures, the Court commented,
“Congress has not designed, and we see no warrant for judicially imposing, a ‘compulsory license’
permitting unfettered access” to these expressions).
211 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
212 Hannelore Dekeyser & Tomas A. Lipinski, Digital Preservation of the Cultural Record in
Archives: A Comparative Copyright Analysis, in ART & LAW 142, 153 (Bert Demarsin et al. eds.,
2008).
213 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2012).
214 Id.
215 See Dekeyser & Lipinski, supra note 212, at 181.

[15:604 2016]

Cultural Heritage & New Media:
A Future for the Past

645

D. Fair Use Exception for Cultural Heritage
One argument put forth in this debate is that the “fair use” exception of
copyright should be expanded to include the specific subject matter of cultural
heritage. However, in addressing this topic, the focus of the legal arguments should
depend less on the distinctions between fair use and fair dealing exemptions and
more on ensuring that the law, through both legislation and judicial interpretation,
in fact, truly acts to promote the main purpose of copyright law: the overall benefit to
the public.216
V. CONCLUSION
It is absolutely imperative that the art history and legal communities take
action to address the concerns raised in this comment. The failure to act will
ultimately stifle the preservation of access to public domain artworks and cultural
heritage. The potential and far-reaching benefits of adopting a collaborative culture
that contributes to a collective memory and a broad understanding of how the world
views heritage as a whole are clear. Technological and digitally-based applications to
cultural heritage threats offer solutions to traditional preservation and exhibition of
cultural heritage, as well as add to the legacy and beneficial commerce provided by
cultural property.217 However, the relative failure or short-comings of the basic legal
process to effectively address, answer, and define the questions relating thereto
discourages the process of creation and incorporation of new media, therefore stifling
any possible benefits flowing therefrom. Multi-modal and multimedia platforms,
cross-cultural collaboration, and inter-disciplinary approaches to the understanding
and sharing of cultural heritage contribute to the global economy in the form of
building and preserving collective memory platforms and practices within the new
media landscape.218
The protections afforded to the broad general notion of intellectual property
were designed to encourage creation. From a policy perspective, the incentive to
individual content creators is a secondary consideration after promoting the
advancement of Science and the Useful Arts. Neither of these interests is being
adequately served in the context of new media, cultural heritage, and respective
copyright protections. The issues presented stem from outdated and uncertain
legalities, limitations, and applications of intellectual property to cultural heritage;
216 However, Section 108 of the Copyright Act grants qualifying libraries and archives
additional rights beyond a general right of fair use, this argument extends that exception beyond
this provision. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a) (2012).
217 See ZHOU ET AL., supra note 7.
218 Protecting intellectual property and cultural heritage in “cyberspace” has been a growing
concern for many, and has become a priority for several industries, in that, without safeguards for
digital heritage, the Internet and all aspects of new media cannot realize the enormous potential as
commercial, educational, and entertainment mediums. The various answers to the legal questions
presented by Cultural Heritage and new media have wide-ranging outcomes and impacts. The
determination of ownership and authorship establish various rights and responsibilities in relation
to the maintenance, upkeep, financial burden, and have an extreme impact on whether these works
of new media and cultural heritage survive or are lost.
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thus hampering the creation and exhibition of new and meaningful scholarship and
creative works centering on and around the preservation, conservation, and
dissemination of cultural heritage.219
New media and technologies, when applied to cultural heritage and made
accessible on a wide scale, further the policy objectives that copyright stands to
promote, while simultaneously benefiting the collective culture of society, the general
welfare of the public, individual content creators, and museums and cultural
institutions.220 In order to ensure that these not only survive, but also are
encouraged, a change must be made and a solution adopted.

219 The result is that intellectual property is presenting and acting as a problem, not a solution.
Defining the legal scope and reach of digital property and cultural heritage is important for users,
creators, consumers, cultures, and society as a whole. Unless a change is made, or a solution
adopted, the problem of legal uncertainties will continue to hinder intellectual property’s main
purpose and underlying policy. First, the economic incentive to create new media works involving
cultural heritage may be undermined by the imposition of additional and substantial costs and
financial burdens upon subsequent creators wishing to use material from existing works, or to
capture existing works of cultural heritage and digitize the objects or artifacts. These creators may
be dissuaded from creating new works incorporating and using as a base existing works for which
they cannot afford the risk of potential intellectual property liability or even threat of litigation.
Second, the public interest may be harmed when works cannot be made available to the public due
to uncertainty over its copyright or cultural heritage ownership and status.
220 In an effort to address the existing counter-arguments that stand against the making public
these digital renderings of cultural heritage, research has proven conclusive that any possible
deterrence impact the availability of these works may have, has, in practice, the opposite result, in
that its availability encourages visitors to come to the museum.
The idea of becoming virtual might not be a pleasant one for some museums,
especially not for art museums who cherish the ideal of the ‘real thing’ and its
aura. But this development is inevitable because of the increasing digitization of
cultural heritage and the demand to make collections more accessible. The
virtual museum is no competitor or danger for the ‘brick and mortar’ museum
because, by its digital nature, it cannot offer real objects to its visitors, as the
traditional museum does. But it can extend the ideas and concepts of collections
into the digital space and in this way reveal the essential nature of the museum.
At the same time the virtual museum will reach out to virtual visitors who might
never be able to visit a certain museum in person.
Werner Schweibenz, The Development of Virtual Museums, 3 ICOM NEWS 3 (2004). It has been
suggested that the application of new media to cultural heritage poses a certain “threat” to
museums insomuch as the availability of 3-D skins and digital replicas may deter “real museum
visits.” This threat was expressed in STUART ROBSON, SALLY MCDONALD, GRAEME WERE, AND
MONA HESS, “3D Recording and Museums,” in DIGITAL HUMANITIES IN PRACTICE, ed. Claire
Warwick et. al. (London: Facet Publishing, 2012), 98. The goal of the virtual museum cannot be to
replace the real museum. Only by cooperation of the ones who work on preserving and presenting
the cultural heritage (historians, archeologists, museum curators, etc.) can results that contribute to
cultural creation can be achieved. The primary aim of virtual museum is to investigate and propose
models for the exploration of the real purpose and conceptual orientation of a museum. However,
research has revealed that 70% of people visiting a museum website would subsequently be more
likely to go to the “real” museum to visit. Loomis, Elias & Wells, supra note 131.

